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Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions
Alan M. Trammell*
The phenomenon of nationwide injunctions—when a single district court
judge completely prevents the government from enforcing a statute, regulation,
or policy—has spawned a vigorous debate. A tentative consensus has emerged
that an injunction should benefit only the actual plaintiffs to a lawsuit and should
not apply to persons who were not parties. These critics root their arguments in
various constitutional and structural constraints on federal courts, including due
process, judicial hierarchy, and inherent limits on “judicial power.”
Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions shows why these arguments fail.
This Article offers one of the few defenses of nationwide injunctions and is
grounded in a unique theory deriving from preclusion. A rich and nuanced
preclusion jurisprudence has developed to answer the very question that the
current debate raises: Who should be bound by the results of litigation?
Preclusion principles help explain why nationwide injunctions do not flout any
constitutional or structural constraints. These principles also reveal the
circumstances under which such an injunction is (and is not) appropriate.
Specifically, they suggest that while a nationwide injunction should not issue as
a matter of course, it is permissible when the government acts in bad faith,
including most notably when government officials fail to abide by settled law.

* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville). I thank the editors
of the Texas Law Review for their excellent work. I am also grateful to Derek Bambauer, Zach
Clopton, Andrew Coan, Marie-Amelie George, David Hausman, Suzette Malveaux, David Marcus,
Toni Massaro, Henry Paul Monaghan, Michael Morley, Alex Nunn, Mila Sohoni, Susannah
Pollvogt, Laurent Sacharoff, Norman Spaulding, Benjamin Spencer, Howard Wasserman,
Stephen F. Williams, Maggie Wittlin, Jordan Woods, and Diego Zambrano for gamely bouncing
around ideas with me and reading early drafts. If any errors remain, I’m appalled that other people
didn’t catch them.
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Introduction
In April 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions famously declared
himself “amazed” that a single “judge sitting on an island in the Pacific”
could enjoin the President from enforcing one iteration of the so-called travel
ban.1 The phrasing was infelicitous. But Sessions captured a widespread
sentiment about the seeming oddity that one district court judge could declare
a federal statute, regulation, or policy invalid and prevent the Executive
Branch from enforcing it anywhere or against anyone.
Although the specific practice is a relatively recent phenomenon,2 it has
taken on fresh life and political salience in the twenty-first century. During
1. Charlie Savage, Jeff Sessions Dismisses Hawaii as ‘an Island in the Pacific,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/us/politics/jeff-sessions-judge-hawaiipacific-island.html [https://perma.cc/9GBC-5LYJ].
2. Professor Bray has dated the practice to the 1960s. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 438–39 (2017). While he argues that
“[t]hrough the middle of the twentieth century, there do not appear to have been any national
injunctions,” id. at 437, a number of scholars have countered this claim quite effectively. Professor
Sohoni has shown through creative and painstaking research that courts have been issuing sweeping
injunctions that directly and intentionally benefit nonparties since at least the beginning of the
twentieth century. See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L.
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George W. Bush’s presidency, individual judges prohibited his
administration from enforcing several environmental regulations.3 Numerous
Obama-era regulations met similar fates,4 perhaps most conspicuously when
a federal judge in Texas prohibited the Department of Homeland Security
from implementing its “deferred action” immigration policies.5 Nationwide
injunctions dominated the headlines during the early weeks of the Trump
Administration, as courts broadly enjoined various versions of the travel
ban,6 and in short order other courts prohibited the Administration from
excluding transgender persons from the military.7 By one count, the Trump
Administration faced twenty-two such injunctions in its first year.8
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2–5) (on file with author). Moreover, historians have
argued that “bills of peace” in equity were close analogues to the modern nationwide injunction.
Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee the City of Chicago at
8, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, No. 18-2885 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018).
3. E.g., Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, Nos. C 05-1144 PJH, C 04-4512 PJH, 2007 WL
1970096, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007); California ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, 468 F. Supp. 2d
1140, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009); Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck,
No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2005); Nw. Envtl. Advocates
v. EPA, No. C 03-05760 SI, 2005 WL 756614, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); Am. Lands All.
v. Norton, No. Civ.A. 00–2339 (RBW), 2004 WL 3246687, at *4 (D.D.C. June 2, 2004).
4. See, e.g., Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670 (N.D. Tex. 2016)
(granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of a regulation enacted pursuant to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 533–34
(E.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of a minimum wage regulation);
Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a nationwide
preliminary injunction of federal guidelines allowing individuals to use restrooms, showers, and
locker rooms based on their gender identity as opposed to their biological sex); NFIB v. Perez, No.
5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (granting a nationwide
preliminary injunction of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Persuader Advice Exemption Rule).
5. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 606, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (issuing preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Deferred Action
for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)).
6. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw.), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 632–33 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d, 883 F.3d 233, 274
(4th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710, 2710 (2018); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239
(D. Haw.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741, 789 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377, 377 (2017); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040,
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539,
566 (D. Md.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554, 606 (4th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S.
Ct. 353, 353 (2017); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CIV. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
7. Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17–1799 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 9732572 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
2017), appeal docketed, No. 18-56539 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018); Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297MJP, 2017 WL 6311305 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017), appeal dismissed, 17–36009, 2017 WL
8229552 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017), appeal
dismissed, 17–2398, 2018 WL 2717050 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d
167 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated, Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
8. Jeff Sessions, Nationwide Injunctions Are a Threat to Our Constitutional Order, NAT’L REV.
(Mar. 10, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/nationwide-injunctions-stopelected-branches-enforcing-law/ [https://perma.cc/ADL3-8X2N]; see also Application for a Stay in
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This power, vested in a single lower court, is profound and discomfiting,
and a consensus started to emerge that nationwide injunctions are never
appropriate. Many scholars endorsed that proposition,9 as did Justice Thomas
in his concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii.10 The Justice Department in
September 2018 directed its civil litigators to oppose nationwide injunctions
as inappropriate in every case.11 And Congress even considered legislation
that would completely prohibit courts from issuing such injunctions.12
Opponents of nationwide injunctions emphasize different arguments to
bolster their conclusion, but a common thread running through all of them is
that nationwide injunctions are anomalous. In this telling, they are
ahistorical.13 They are inconsistent with principles of equity.14 And they

the Alternative to a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgement to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit at 22, Trump v. Karnoski, No. 18-676 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2018) (arguing that in two years
“district courts have issued 25 nationwide injunctions or temporary restraining orders” against the
Trump administration).
9. Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 243, 257 (2016); Bray, supra note 2, at 469; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good
Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 512 (2017); Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other
Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 522–23 (2016) [hereinafter Morley, De
Facto Class Actions?]; Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial
Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017) [hereinafter Morley, Nationwide
Injunctions]; Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal”
Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 353 (2018); Getzel
Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural Approach, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1073 (2017); see also Letter from Law Professors to Members of Congress
Regarding H.R. 6730, at 135–37 (Sept. 10, 2018) (letter from eighteen legal academics endorsing a
categorical prohibition on nationwide injunctions).
10. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2426–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
equity requires injunctions to be limited to the parties to a case).
11. See Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to Heads of Civil Litigating Components and U.S.
Att’ys, on Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the Possibility for Nationwide Injunctions
(Sept. 13, 2018) (on file with the Department of Justice) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines for Nationwide
Injunctions] (“The Department consistently has argued against granting relief outside of the parties
to a case.”).
12. See Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. § 2(a), (2018)
(directing that no federal court may issue “an order that purports to restrain the enforcement against
a non-party of any statute, regulation, order, or similar authority”).
13. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 2, at 437 (tracing the first instance of a nationwide injunction to
1963).
14. See, e.g., id. at 425 (“There is an easy, uncomplicated answer to the question whether the
national injunction is traceable to traditional equity: no.”); Wasserman, supra note 9, at 339 (arguing
that “[u]niversal injunctions remain inconsistent with the historic scope of courts’ equity powers”);
cf. Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner and Appellee the City of
Chicago at 1, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, No. 18-2885 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018) (arguing that bills
of peace in equity were close analogues of the modern nationwide injunction).
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violate constitutional and structural imperatives,15 including due process,16
Article III’s definition of the “judicial power,”17 and fundamental notions of
judicial hierarchy.18
Several scholars have convincingly challenged the erstwhile consensus.
Their contributions are careful and thoughtful, persuasively demonstrating
why nationwide injunctions are sometimes necessary for pragmatic reasons19
or to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs in a given case.20 This work has
provided a critical counterweight to the arguments against nationwide
injunctions, but an important problem remains unresolved—how to justify
nationwide injunctions as a theoretical matter, particularly when those
injunctions benefit nonparties intentionally rather than just incidentally.
Nationwide injunctions indeed raise thorny issues, but they are not
conceptually or doctrinally peculiar. At their core, the problems revolve
around one central question: Who should be bound by the results of
litigation?
This question is far from new, and several interlocking doctrines have
developed to answer it, including, most notably, preclusion.21 When someone

15. See DOJ Guidelines for Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 11 (“And more recently, the
Department has continued to challenge the entry of nationwide injunctions in a number of cases on
constitutional and equitable grounds.”).
16. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 527.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”); see also Bray, supra note 2, at 471–72 (“The court has no constitutional basis to decide
disputes and issue remedies for those who are not parties.”); Bruhl, supra note 9, at 517 (“The
requirement of standing (along with other constitutional justiciability doctrines) ensures that the
federal courts exercise only properly judicial power.”).
18. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 520, 537–38; Morley, Nationwide
Injunctions, supra note 9, at 649; Berger, supra note 9, at 1088, 1101.
19. See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide
Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51–52 (2017) (arguing that nationwide injunctions can prevent
irreparable harm); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065,
1098–101 (2018) (arguing that “[n]ationwide injunctions are sometimes the only practicable method
of providing relief”); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 61 (2017) (“[T]he risk of irreparable harm that an injunction would
address makes more immediate legal resolution appropriate at times.”).
20. See Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2140–44 (2017)
(exploring how nationwide injunctions are often necessary to provide “complete relief” to plaintiffs
in private-law litigation). As discussed below, however, the complete-relief doctrine does not
explain whether and under what circumstances a court may fashion relief for nonparties in a
targeted, rather than merely incidental, way.
21. Zach Clopton has also begun to explore the parallels between nationwide injunctions and
preclusion. See Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 117 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 38–41), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290345 [https://perma.cc/
8LKQ-MZH6] (comparing nationwide injunctions and nonmutual preclusion). His article traces the
historical development of preclusion principles. This Article focuses more on the structural
arguments about nationwide injunctions and builds out the preclusion analogy with reference to
nonacquiescence doctrines and bad faith.
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litigates a matter and loses, preclusion principles usually prevent her from
relitigating that same matter in a subsequent lawsuit. More precisely,
preclusion helps resolve who is bound by an unfavorable result and,
conversely, who may take advantage of a favorable one. These are among the
knottiest questions that nationwide injunctions raise.
Focusing on the quirks of nationwide injunctions runs the risk of
obscuring the coherence and fairness that preclusion already fosters across
wide swaths of the legal landscape. Accordingly, viewing nationwide
injunctions through the lens of preclusion and related principles can help
explain why such remedies are not categorically verboten and also can
provide a theoretically robust understanding of the circumstances under
which they should issue. The rich and nuanced parallels between nationwide
injunctions and preclusion suggest a surprisingly straightforward solution to
this vexing debate.
In short, just as courts do not automatically apply certain contentious
forms of preclusion, so too they should not issue nationwide injunctions as a
matter of course. The touchstone for when nationwide injunctions are most
necessary and appropriate is when the government acts in bad faith by
refusing to abide by settled law.
Some definitional brush clearing at the outset: My focus here is on
injunctions that (1) a court issues in the absence of a duly certified class
action and that (2) govern the totality of a defendant’s wrongful conduct, even
with respect to nonparties. So, one might more accurately call these nonclass,
defendant-oriented injunctions.22 Sometimes such injunctions apply
nationwide, but other times they don’t (say, when a court enjoins a state
official from enforcing a voting regulation statewide). Although “nationwide
injunction” is a deeply imperfect term,23 I have opted for the most familiar
nomenclature.24
Part I of this Article debunks the constitutional and structural objections
to the nationwide injunction. Preclusion is a large part of that story. For
example, it can explain what some scholars regard as the most disconcerting

22. See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 490–91 (defining defendant-oriented
injunctions).
23. Other scholars have suggested alternative terminology. See Bray, supra note 2, at 419 n.5
(preferring “national injunction”); Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 490 (preferring
“defendant-oriented injunction”); Wasserman, supra note 9, at 349–53 (arguing that “universal
injunction” is the appropriate term).
24. A final note on terminology: Just as a “nationwide injunction” does not necessarily apply
nationwide, it technically does not even have to be an injunction. Although there are critical
differences between preliminary injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and permanent
injunctions, I generally do not distinguish between them here. They obviously vary in scope and
effect, but when such relief directly and intentionally benefits nonparties, the concerns are
overwhelmingly the same. To the extent that the distinctions matter, I make clear which remedy I
am discussing.
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features of the nationwide injunction—that nonparties receive the benefit of
a judgment and that lower courts can effectively bind higher courts as well
as courts in other geographic jurisdictions. With preclusion, though, none of
this is anomalous or problematic.
Part II develops the analogy between nationwide injunctions and
preclusion, arguing that preclusion doctrine can elucidate the circumstances
under which a nationwide injunction is appropriate. At a basic level, the
analogy is straightforward. Assume that A sues the government (say, alleging
that a policy is unconstitutional) and wins. B then brings her own lawsuit and
argues that the government, which already had its day in court on this
question, should be precluded from relitigating whether the policy is
constitutional. Under usual preclusion principles, B’s argument is viable.
A nationwide injunction essentially accomplishes the same end. Once A
has litigated and prevailed, a nationwide injunction allows B (and many
others) to benefit from the holding. The analogy becomes more complicated
in light of limits on certain forms of preclusion and, most importantly, the
Supreme Court’s refusal to apply nonmutual preclusion against the federal
government in United States v. Mendoza.25
These limitations on the analogy are not fatal. In fact, they turn out to
be analytically productive and are the key to discerning when nationwide
injunctions are (and are not) proper. The Mendoza doctrine, which
overwhelmingly permits the government to relitigate questions that it has
lost, also enables the government to engage in nonacquiescence—a practice
whereby the government refuses to conform its conduct to judicial precedent
and instead adheres to its own interpretation of the law. Nonacquiescence is
understandably controversial. Prominent scholars have defended it, though,
as an interim measure when the law is in flux and the government is acting
in good faith to vindicate its view.26 But once the law becomes settled,
nonacquiescence is impermissible.
Relying on these carefully refined preclusion and nonacquiescence
principles, Part III articulates the standard that should govern whether courts
grant nationwide injunctions. Presumptively, a nationwide injunction should
not issue, especially when courts are still grappling with an unsettled legal
question and the government is defending its position in good faith. However,
when the government refuses in bad faith to abide by settled law, a
nationwide injunction is appropriate. Such injunctions might also be
appropriate when the law is, so to speak, settled enough. Drawing on an

25. 464 U.S. 154, 164 (1984).
26. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 753–58 (1989) (defending intracircuit nonacquiescence as an
appropriate “interim measure” when “the law remains in flux” and an agency is “reasonably seeking
to vindicate its position in the court of appeals and before the Supreme Court”).
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informal rule that the Department of Justice traditionally has observed, I
suggest a “rule of three.” That is, when three lower courts have resolved a
particular question in the same way, a nationwide injunction might be
appropriate, especially if there is a particular need to resolve that question
uniformly and expeditiously.
Part III concludes by situating nationwide injunctions within wider
developments, including the litigation of public-law issues that have farreaching effects beyond the actual parties to a case. Through precedent, class
actions, and other forms of embedded aggregation, law can become settled
for society writ large. Nationwide injunctions fit comfortably within this
unexceptional phenomenon. Moreover, the contemporary discussion of
nationwide injunctions informs the debate about judicial supremacy (the idea
that courts determine what the law is generally) versus departmentalism (the
theory that courts resolve only specific cases and that other constitutional
actors remain free to interpret the law as they see fit). The fundamental notion
that law can become settled suffuses all of these potent debates. Losing sight
of that premise invites doctrinal oddities and theoretical errors that are both
pernicious and avoidable.
I.

Constitutional and Structural Limits
Those who have argued that nationwide injunctions are impermissible
partially ground their objections in constitutional and structural constraints.
These include fundamental notions of due process, judicial hierarchy, and
limits on the judicial power. None of these objections are sustainable.
Opponents also advance practical and prudential arguments, which are
far more persuasive and should factor into courts’ decision-making, as Part II
discusses––but first things first.
A.

Due Process
Among the core constitutional objections to nationwide injunctions is
the claim that they violate due process norms. This contention fails for two
main reasons. First, due process concerns arise primarily when a nonparty is
bound by an adverse judgment, but that concern is almost entirely absent with
nationwide injunctions against a governmental entity. Second, due process
does not presumptively give every interested person a right to participate or
be heard when courts adjudicate public rights.
As opponents of nationwide injunctions note, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly observed that due process prevents someone from being “bound
by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a
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party.”27 Until the middle of the twentieth century, this ensured a certain
symmetry—only actual parties were bound by judgments. Accordingly, one
might infer that a nonparty should not benefit from a nationwide injunction.
But preclusion has evolved and demonstrates why nationwide
injunctions actually do not implicate core due process concerns. Preclusion
principles indeed used to require “mutuality”—that the same parties be
involved in the first and second lawsuits—such that only those specific
parties could invoke preclusion’s benefits.28 Courts have steadily relaxed the
insistence on mutuality, though, meaning that nonparties increasingly may
take advantage of preclusion.29
Consider, for example, a case in which a plaintiff sues a defendant for
infringing the plaintiff’s patent, and the defendant wins on the ground that
the patent is invalid. The same plaintiff then attempts to sue a second
defendant, also alleging infringement of the (now invalid) patent. Even
though the new defendant was not a party to the first lawsuit, she may invoke
issue preclusion against the plaintiff. This is entirely fair because the plaintiff
already litigated (and lost) the question of the patent’s validity.30
The key for due process purposes is that the person against whom
preclusion is invoked must have been a party to the lawsuit and, so to speak,
had her “day in court.”31 Thus, the specter of a due process violation largely
disappears when a nonparty benefits from, but is not burdened by, the results
of a lawsuit.
This is almost exactly what happens when a nationwide injunction
issues against the government. Nonparties did not participate in the lawsuit,
but they presumptively have no due process objection because they benefit
from the judgment. At the same time, the government has no cognizable due
process objection because even though it is being bound by what it regards
as an unfavorable judgment, it actually participated in the lawsuit. That is,

27. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)); see, e.g., Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 516 (noting that “[a] judgment
generally does not apply beyond the immediate parties to a case”).
28. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 102 (2001);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4448 (3d ed. 2017).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); SHAPIRO, supra note
28, at 105–09; Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 281–85 (1957).
30. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 314–17, 328–34, 345–50
(1971) (describing this scenario and presumptively approving preclusion).
31. Id. at 329, 340; James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of
Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U. L. REV. 383, 386–87 (1983);
see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (observing in dicta that “[i]t
is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a
privy”).
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the government has already received what due process requires—a “full and
fair” opportunity to litigate the matter.32
A second due process objection posits that the supposed beneficiaries of
nationwide injunctions actually might not want what the nationwide
injunction offers.33 Indeed, one of the principal difficulties of litigation over
public rights is that one person or a small group of people can bring a lawsuit
that has groupwide effects, even though not all members of the group share
the same goals. Scholars have been grappling with this problem for years and
have proposed numerous ways to ameliorate the problem.34 These concerns
are real, and courts and scholars are wise to be sensitive to them. For these
very reasons, as I argue below, courts should not issue sweeping injunctions
as a matter of course.35 But the appropriate limits on nationwide
injunctions—as with many instances of groupwide litigation—are prudential
in nature and do not derive from constitutional notions of due process.36
Consider the immigration case in Texas regarding President Obama’s
deferred action policy. Twenty-six states successfully challenged the policy,
and the resulting nationwide injunction prohibited the Administration from
enforcing it anywhere.37 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia had filed
an amicus brief arguing that they did not welcome the injunction and, instead,
received “substantial economic, social welfare, and public safety benefits”
from the deferred action policy.38 Perhaps the federal court should have
accorded greater weight to the view of states that supported the Obama
Administration. However, due process jurisprudence demonstrates that the
failure to do so reflected at worst bad judgment, not a constitutional violation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that due process rights sometimes
attach when members of a group do not share the same litigation goals, but
those concerns do not apply in the context of nationwide injunctions. In class

32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
33. See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 517 (arguing that nationwide
injunctions impermissibly give actual plaintiffs power “to leverage the rights of third parties . . .
without giving them an opportunity to opt out”).
34. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective,
77 NW. U. L. REV. 492, 492–93 (1982) (examining the dilemma that class actions can neglect the
interests of some class members); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1183, 1183–86 (1982) (exploring and critiquing various approaches for dealing with intraclass
conflicts); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1625–26 (1997) (exploring
various models for dealing with problems of group decision-making).
35. See infra subpart III(A) (discussing when nationwide injunctions are most appropriate).
36. Cf. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 531 (arguing that even if certain
concerns “do not amount to due process violations, it still seems unfair and undesirable” for courts
to issue broad injunctions affecting nonparties).
37. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015).
38. Amicus Brief of The States of Washington et al. in Support of Petitioners at 1, Texas v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 922867, at *1.
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actions that aggregate individual damages claims, for example, class
members have the right to receive notice, an opportunity to be heard, and,
most critically for present purposes, the ability to opt out of the class action.39
This is, in essence, a due process right not to sue if one objects to the ends or
means of a class action.40 By contrast, the Court has declined to find that such
protections govern actions seeking equitable relief, such as injunctions.41 The
distinction makes good sense, especially with respect to relief that is truly
indivisible.42
Challenges to a statute or a regulation often involve litigation of a public
right that cannot sensibly apply to different people in different ways. In these
situations, individual due process rights simply do not attach. Accordingly,
there is no individualized right to participate in a precedent-creating lawsuit,
even though the precedent becomes widely binding.43 The same notion
applies with respect to class actions that seek broad injunctive relief. 44
Similarly, when courts adjudicate a truly public right (such as whether a
particular regulation is constitutional), due process does not require that any
specific person have a right to participate in the lawsuit, in part because any
person’s interest likely is one that she shares with other members of the
public. This stands in stark contrast to the individual right to notice and a
hearing when someone has unique or personal rights (such as an individual
damages claim) that other members of the public likely will not pursue with
sufficient vigor.45

39. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
40. Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 599, 603–05 (2015).
41. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3 (“We intimate no view concerning other types
of class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief.”).
42. See Williams, supra note 40, at 649–51 (analyzing when indivisible relief may be afforded).
Not every lawsuit that seeks an injunction will involve a public right or truly indivisible relief. See,
e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations
of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1609 (2007) (suggesting, for example, that an
injunction against an employer to rectify discriminatory hiring practices is divisible because it could
apply to some but not all employees). But the precise line of demarcation is not especially relevant
at the moment; the overarching conceptual point still holds true.
43. See infra subpart III(B) (examining the limits of class actions); see also, e.g., Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1254, 1288 n.183 (1961) (noting “an absent party may be prejudiced by the stare decisis effect
of a decision, but surely no one will urge that all persons must be joined in a suit the decision of
which may sometime serve as an adverse precedent”); Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and
Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 598 (2017) (arguing that precedent “in many instances
is simply irreconcilable with the day-in-court ideal”).
44. This helps explain why plaintiffs must have opt-out rights in damages class actions but not
in class actions that seek injunctive relief only. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)–(3) (explaining when a
class action may be maintained).
45. In this vein, see the classic distinction between Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S.
373, 385 (1908), and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
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Taken together, this jurisprudence demonstrates that when a court
broadly enjoins the government from enforcing a generally applicable statute
or policy, due process is a red herring. Thus, while some states that did not
participate in the Texas deferred action litigation were surely miffed when a
court issued a nationwide injunction, the court did not trench on any
constitutional right to participate or be heard.
Nationwide injunctions potentially could raise a constitutional due
process concern in one narrow sense. The Supreme Court consistently has
grounded its personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence in the Due Process
Clauses.46 So, if a court attempted to make someone an actual party to a
lawsuit (say, in certifying a class of plaintiffs), certain due process
protections would apply.47 This has little to no bearing on most nationwide
injunctions, though, in which the problematic questions concern the rights of
nonparties.
The breadth of nationwide injunctions certainly raises a host of
difficulties, particularly when nonparties disagree with the actual parties’
goals and tactics. However, those concerns are prudential, rather than
constitutional, and thus beyond the reach of (constitutional) due process.
B.

Judicial Hierarchy
Opponents also raise the structural objection that nationwide injunctions
contravene judicial hierarchy and courts’ inherently circumscribed power.
This objection can take several different forms. One focuses on the seeming
oddity that when a federal district court issues a nationwide injunction, it
effectively binds a higher court. Relatedly, when a single district court issues
a sweeping injunction, that court’s ruling effectively becomes binding
outside the geographic limits of its jurisdiction.48

46. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,”
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1153 (2015) (“The Court has long identified the Due Process Clauses
as the font of these restrictions.”); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 209–13 (2004) (noting “the
Supreme Court’s insistence that the Due Process Clause is the exclusive source of authority for such
rules”).
47. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (“The plaintiff must
receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or
through counsel.”); see also Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of
Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2074–83 (2015) (proposing
ways to enable courts to certify classes more readily).
48. See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 537–38 (noting the problems of a
court’s “giving its legal opinion the force of law on a statewide or nationwide basis, beyond where
its opinions have expositive effect”); Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 9, at 649 (“The
limited geographic scope and legal effects of lower court opinions cast doubt on the propriety of
nationwide injunctions.”); Berger, supra note 9, at 1088 (“By definition, nationwide injunctions
impose one court’s holding onto areas and people beyond its jurisdiction.”).
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Regardless of the precise nature of the judicial-hierarchy objection, the
underlying logic remains the same. It rests on the premise that the federal
court system is organized geographically by circuit, such that each court of
appeals reviews the decisions of district courts within the circuit and, in so
doing, creates binding precedent within (but not outside of) the circuit.49
Moreover, as courts and scholars frequently remark, federal district court
precedents are never binding on any other court or even themselves.50 Based
on this organization of the federal judiciary—and, in particular, the way that
binding precedent operates—some commentators have suggested that district
courts should not issue nationwide injunctions and that courts of appeals, at
most, should confine relief within their geographic boundaries.51
Preclusion, though, illustrates why nationwide injunctions are not
anomalous and do not flout inherent notions of hierarchy. Inferior courts
often issue rulings that bind courts in other jurisdictions and even
occasionally superior courts that normally have revisory power over those
rulings.
Consider first the potential for a lower court to bind a higher court.
Admittedly, judicial hierarchy does not usually work this way because a
superior court creates binding precedent for a lower court but not vice versa.
Under certain circumstances, though, preclusion allows a lower court to
render a decision that binds a higher court.
Imagine, for example, an initial lawsuit in which A litigates a particular
matter (say, A’s liability under a contract), loses, and declines to appeal. The
resulting judgment is final. In a second lawsuit that involves the same
contract, preclusion likely will prevent A from relitigating its liability under
the contract. Most importantly, if the parties then appeal the second decision
to a higher court, preclusion from the first lawsuit will continue to be binding.
Thus, a lower court will have decided an issue in the first lawsuit, and a
superior court will have to treat that decision as binding during the second
lawsuit’s appeal.52
Next, consider a district court’s power to bind courts and people in other
geographic jurisdictions. This actually happens with far greater regularity, as
principles of equity and preclusion demonstrate.

49. See Berger, supra note 9, at 1093–96 (discussing current structure of circuits under the
Evarts Act of 1891).
50. E.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 (1994).
51. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 517, 556; Morley, Nationwide
Injunctions, supra note 9, at 621; see also Berger, supra note 9, at 1100 (proposing that injunctions
should never exceed “the circuit border of the enjoining court”).
52. See id. (noting that a “final, unappealed judgment on the merits” is usually entitled to
preclusive effect).
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One of equity’s traditional maxims is that “equity acts in personam.”53
Accordingly, when a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant and
issues an injunction, the duty imposed need not be geographically confined.
To the contrary, a court should accord “complete relief” to the aggrieved
plaintiff, irrespective of geography.54
Similarly, preclusion can travel across geographic boundaries.55 Take a
variation on the above example in which A litigates a question about a
contract’s validity, loses, and declines to appeal. Even if a second lawsuit
takes place in a different jurisdiction, preclusion from the first lawsuit is
likely binding on the second court because, as a general rule, a court that
renders a judgment also dictates the judgment’s preclusive consequences,
regardless of where the second lawsuit takes place.56 Note also the possibility
that in the second lawsuit, someone who was not a party to the first lawsuit
might have the ability to invoke preclusion.57
All of this leads to two critical conclusions. First, a court’s power to bind
parties—or even conclusively resolve a matter involving certain nonparties—
is not coextensive with its geographic jurisdiction. Second, a court’s power
to bind is not coextensive with its supervisory power or its related ability to
create binding precedent. For example, federal district courts do not review
courts of appeals or ever generate binding precedent. Nevertheless, under
certain circumstances, district court decisions can bind litigants and courts—
even courts that have supervisory power over them—anywhere in the
country.58 This state of affairs is unexceptional. Put somewhat differently, a

53. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 286 (2009); Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity,
1993 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 30 (1993); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)
(noting that in equity “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation
established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class”).
54. Siddique, supra note 20, at 2103–04.
55. Trammell, supra note 43, at 593; see also Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 9, at
636–37 (noting that “[t]he res judicata effect of a judgment is not subject to geographic limits”).
56. The full faith and credit statute mandates this result when the rendering court is a state court,
even if the second tribunal is a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012); see also, e.g., Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“It is now settled that a federal court
must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment
under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”). Federal common law determines
the preclusive consequences of a federal court judgment. See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001) (so holding but noting that in a diversity action federal courts
usually should refer to state preclusion law).
57. This is an example of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. See infra Part II.
58. Another example of this phenomenon comes from state courts. In the federal system, a court
of appeals creates binding precedent only for the courts that it directly supervises. So, Ninth Circuit
precedent binds district courts in the circuit, but that precedent is only persuasive authority for other
district courts. But in some states, like California, every lower court is bound by higher court
precedents, even precedents from courts that do not directly supervise or review that lower court.
See, e.g., Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 940 (Cal. 1962) (“Decisions of
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court’s power to bind through preclusion and nationwide injunctions alike is
not necessarily yoked to the court’s geographic boundaries or the extent to
which it creates binding precedent.
These conclusions do not imply that geography and judicial hierarchy
are irrelevant. As critics of nationwide injunctions correctly observe, if
different district courts issue conflicting nationwide injunctions, those courts
might impose inconsistent obligations, which can prove deeply
problematic.59 Injunctions that are sensitive to courts’ geographic boundaries
help avoid such inconsistency. Critically, though, a geographic limiting
principle on a court’s remedial authority does not operate as a matter of
power, only comity.60
The idea of comity is, in fact, central to how courts with overlapping
geographic jurisdiction navigate the omnipresent risk of inconsistent
judgments and obligations. Comity plays a crucial role in a system that
presumptively gives state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to
adjudicate federal law.61 Perhaps the clearest example comes from the D.C.
Court of Appeals (the highest local court in the District of Columbia) and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The two courts’ geographic
jurisdictions overlap perfectly, and until the Supreme Court intervenes, they
are equally competent to interpret federal law for the District of Columbia.
Occasionally, they adopt clashing interpretations.62 The overwhelming
majority of the time, though, the courts negotiate potential problems
seamlessly, but only as a matter of comity, not geographical restrictions on
their power.
As discussed at greater length in Part III, the risk of inconsistency should
weigh heavily in a court’s prudential assessment of whether a nationwide
injunction is appropriate. Actual inconsistency is probably the most
significant reason why courts should decline to issue nationwide injunctions.

every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts
and upon all the superior courts of this state.”) (en banc).
59. For an especially nice example of such inconsistent obligations, see Berger, supra note 9,
at 1088–89.
60. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702–03 (1979) (“[A] federal court when
asked to certify a nationwide class should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed
appropriate in the case before it, and that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere
with the litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts. But we decline to adopt the extreme
position that such a class may never be certified.”).
61. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–60 (1990) (articulating the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction).
62. For example, until the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller, the D.C. Court
of Appeals and the D.C. Circuit had adopted radically different views of whether the District’s
handgun ordinances were constitutional. Compare Andrews v. United States, 922 A.2d 449, 455
(D.C. 2007), with Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub
nom. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).

TRAMMELL.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

82

11/26/2019 9:19 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 98:67

However, when no inconsistency exists—and especially when the law is
clear—nothing restricts courts’ power to issue a nationwide injunction.
C.

The Judicial Power
One of the more fundamental objections posits that the Article III
“judicial power” does not countenance nationwide injunctions.63 According
to this argument, courts possess only the “power to decide a case for a
particular claimant.”64 That narrowly circumscribed power supposedly
means that a court may exercise its remedial authority only on behalf of
plaintiffs who allege injury and, conversely, that a court has no power to
venture beyond the parties’ specific dispute.65 In other words, the judicial
power allegedly connotes authority to render judgments and accord relief
only to the actual parties.
This argument against nationwide injunctions fails for three reasons.
First, the judicial power fundamentally concerns judicial finality, which has
nothing to do with party status. Second, even to the extent that the judicial
power incorporates “case or controversy” requirements, such as standing,
nationwide injunctions spring from such live lawsuits. Finally, the Supreme
Court no longer adheres slavishly to the dispute-resolution model that
motivates opponents’ arguments against nationwide injunctions.
To some observers, this subpart’s conclusion might seem painfully
obvious. One might succinctly summarize the point as follows: When courts
issue nationwide injunctions, they do so in the context of a live case or
controversy and for the benefit of a plaintiff who has standing; therefore,
whatever other objections one might have to nationwide injunctions, there is
no Article III problem. I am sympathetic to this distillation. The argument is
worth unpacking, though, because some scholars have forcefully pressed the
idea that nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional,66 and the Department
of Justice now fully embraces and advocates that position in every case
presenting the possibility of a nationwide injunction.67 Although the

63. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
64. Bray, supra note 2, at 471.
65. Id.; Bruhl, supra note 9, at 517–19.
66. E.g., Bray, supra note 2, at 471–72; Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 523–
27; Wasserman, supra note 9, at 359–63.
67. DOJ Guidelines for Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 11, at 2; see also, e.g., Application
for a Stay Pending Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Pending
Further Proceedings in This Court at 36–37, Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, No. 19A230 (U.S.
Aug. 26, 2019) (arguing that “[a]s a general rule, courts lack the authority to enter universal
injunctions that preclude enforcement of a law or rule against all persons”); Brief for Appellant at
21–25, City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2991), 2017 WL 5957541,
at *21 (arguing that the injunction should be vacated based on “principles of Article III standing”).
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Article III objection is misplaced, it is now, to borrow a phrase, “on the
wall.”68
1. Judicial Finality.—Since the earliest days of the republic, the
Supreme Court has grappled with what the judicial power does and does not
allow. The common theme running through the Court’s jurisprudence is that
the judicial power entails the authority to render a final judgment, with an
emphasis on finality. Critically, that power does not turn on party status.
One of the hallmarks of the federal judicial power is that the political
branches may not revise a court’s judgment.69 In the earliest case announcing
and applying this principle, Hayburn’s Case,70 the Supreme Court rejected
the role that Article III judges were supposed to play in administering a
compensation scheme for Revolutionary War veterans. The problem was that
judicial determinations of eligibility were subject to executive revision—
specifically, by the Secretary of War.71 The Supreme Court declared such a
design “radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power
which is vested in the courts.”72 Similarly, in United States v. Klein,73 the
Court rejected an attempt by Congress to redefine the President’s pardon
power, contravening recent Supreme Court precedent, and to dictate a result
inconsistent with what the Court believed the Constitution required.74

68. Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/
from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ [https://
perma.cc/Q5G9-P6UH].
69. Congress may change the law that underlies a judgment, see, for example, Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32 (1855), but it may not revise the
judgment itself.
70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409–10 (1792) (adjudicating a writ of mandamus under the Invalid
Pensions Act of 1792).
71. Id. at 413.
72. Id. at 411 (opinion of Wilson and Blair, JJ., and Peters, J.); see also id. at 413 (opinion of
Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves, J.) (“[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under any
circumstances . . . be liable to a reversion . . . .”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III
Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J.
1346, 1432 (2015) (“Hayburn’s Case should be read as a precedent that insists on judicial finality.”).
73. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). The effect of a presidential pardon was a critical issue for
southerners who wanted to use a pardon as evidence that they had “never given any aid or comfort”
to the Confederate rebellion, a prerequisite to their reclaiming seized property after the Civil War.
Id. at 131 (emphasis removed) (quoting An Act to Provide for the Collection of Abandoned Property
and for the Prevention of Funds in Insurrecting Districts with the United States, ch. 120, § 3 (1863)).
74. Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2549
(1998); Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 103, 109 (Vicki C. Jackson &
Judith Resnik eds., 2010); see also Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 910 (1984)
(arguing that Klein stands for the proposition that Congress cannot require a court to decide cases
in disregard of the Constitution); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution,
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Congress, in other words, had usurped the judicial role. Thus, while
Hayburn’s Case turned on an executive incursion on the judicial power, Klein
involved an equally problematic legislative transgression.
More recently, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,75 presented a variation
on the same themes. The plaintiffs originally had asserted claims alleging
violations of federal securities law, which the Supreme Court in an earlier
case had dismissed as time-barred.76 Thus, unlike in Hayburn’s Case, those
claims did result in final Article III judgments. Congress then intervened by
reinstating the dismissed claims and giving the plaintiffs a new statute of
limitations.77 Plaut held that this constituted “a clear violation of the
separation-of-powers principle” that Congress may not reopen a final
damages judgment.78 More to the point, the Court explicitly described the
reopening of final judgments as an incursion on the judicial power—“the
power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them.”79
The lynchpin of what constitutes judicial power is thus final decisionmaking authority over a case.80 By all appearances, that question has little, if
any, bearing on whether a nationwide injunction—or, for that matter, any
judgment that directly benefits nonparties—is proper.
2. Cases and Controversies.—Determining which disputes qualify as
“Cases” and “Controversies”81 for purposes of Article III—including
whether someone is a proper party to a lawsuit—presents a related but

86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2528 (1998) (explaining that “Congress attempted to conscript the judiciary in a
constitutional charade”).
75. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
76. See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991) (dismissing as time-barred plaintiffs’
claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5).
77. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–17 (quoting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 and describing it as “the reopening of final judgments”).
78. Id. at 225.
79. Id. at 218–19; see also id. at 219 (“‘[A] judgment conclusively resolves the case’ because
‘a “judicial Power” is one to render dispositive judgments.’” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1989))).
80. What counts as finality in a case that involves continuing injunctive relief is different.
Congress may change the underlying law, which a court then applies when fashioning or revising
prospective relief. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) (“Prospective relief under
a continuing executory decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law.”).
This comports with the longstanding distinction that the Supreme Court has drawn between a
situation in which Congress permissibly changes the underlying law versus one in which Congress
impermissibly revises a final judgment. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32 (1855) (explaining that Congress has no power to revise a
retrospective damages award but may prospectively change the underlying law). But finality, based
on the existing law, is still central to the judicial power.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (listing cases and controversies to which the judicial power
extends).
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separate problem.82 History83 and the experience of states84 suggest that
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement—including its attendant
doctrines, like standing, mootness, and the like—is not a defining feature of
the judicial power. Rather, that the judicial power is something distinct, as
the Court usually acknowledges, and such power extends to, and may be
exercised only in conjunction with, live cases and controversies.85
But regardless of whether the case-or-controversy requirement exists as
a distinct concept or is subsumed within the judicial power,86 nationwide
injunctions remain constitutionally unproblematic. Some opponents of
nationwide injunctions contend that nonparties do not have standing to

82. See id. (providing that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to” enumerated “Cases” and
“Controversies”).
83. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 72, at 1418–21 (arguing that “judicial power” always
included power over certain nonadversarial proceedings).
84. California, for example, readily allows citizens to bring lawsuits in the “undifferentiated
public interest.” Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. State, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (1997) (permitting
a citizen suit to enforce Proposition 65 and holding that “a suit by a citizen in the undifferentiated
public interest is ‘justiciable,’ or appropriate for decision in a California Court”). In federal court,
such lawsuits would constitute “generalized grievance[s]” that fail to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574–75 (1992) (holding that claims for
“general grievance[s]” do not state an Article III case or controversy); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014) (holding that “general grievances”
do not present constitutional “cases” or “controversies”). Nevertheless, California has a long
tradition of allowing citizens’ suits to ensure governmental compliance with the law. See, e.g., Save
the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 1008 (Cal. 2011) (reaffirming
“public interest standing”); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 225–27 (Cal. 1975) (upholding
permissibility of taxpayer suits, despite absence of concrete injury, and distinguishing federal
standing doctrine). The U.S. Supreme Court itself has recognized that some cases raising federal
law questions can be justiciable in state court, even when they do not satisfy the strictures of an
Article III case or controversy. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We
have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts . . . .”); Doremus
v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (explaining that, unlike federal
courts, a state court may render an advisory opinion). This raises the intriguing, and eminently
defensible, possibility that state courts (but not federal courts) might be able to adjudicate certain
questions of federal law. See Zachary D. Clopton, Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative
State, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1442–44 (2018) (arguing that states and administrative agencies
should embrace the opportunity to adjudicate cases dismissed for lack of federal justiciability).
85. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Although the Constitution
does not fully explain what is meant by ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States,’ Art. III, § 1, it
does specify that this power extends only to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ Art. III, § 2.”); Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011) (noting that “a plaintiff who seeks
to invoke the federal judicial power” must demonstrate more than a generalized grievance)
(emphasis added); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974) (noting that “this Court
held that judicial power may be exercised only in a case properly before it”) (emphasis added).
86. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & St., Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (“Article III of the Constitution limits the ‘judicial power’ of the United States
to the resolution of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”); see also, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007) (using exact same language); Bruhl, supra note 9, at 517
(arguing that standing doctrine “ensures that the federal courts exercise only properly judicial
power” and citing cases).
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pursue or benefit from a given remedy, such as a sweeping injunction.87 This
argument is unavailing, though, because courts that issue nationwide
injunctions indeed have proper cases and controversies before them.
The Supreme Court’s familiar standing jurisprudence requires a proper
plaintiff—one with a concrete and particularized injury, which is traceable to
the defendant’s conduct and susceptible of judicial remedy.88 Furthermore,
the Court insists that the plaintiff must have “remedial standing”89—that is,
not just standing to bring a lawsuit but standing to pursue each specific
remedy. The classic example of remedial standing problems is City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons,90 in which a plaintiff sued the City of Los Angeles and four
police officers who had placed him in a chokehold.91 The Court held that even
if the plaintiff could pursue a damages remedy for past harm, he did not have
standing to seek an injunction because he could not show a “real or immediate
threat” that the police would place him in a chokehold in the future.92
Furthermore, a plaintiff generally must assert his or her own rights, rather
than the rights of others.93
Even within this increasingly stringent framework, though, nationwide
injunctions still flow from live cases and controversies. Return to the
injunction against the Obama Administration’s deferred action policies. The
State of Texas established a concrete and particularized injury—and thus
standing—by alleging that the new policy would make certain immigrants
eligible for state-subsidized driver’s licenses, thus costing Texas money.94
The harm was substantial, and because it had not abated, Texas also had

87. See, e.g., Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 516 (arguing that “individual
plaintiffs in nonclass cases in federal court generally lack Article III standing to seek relief for
anyone other than themselves”); see also Bruhl, supra note 9, at 519 (“Given that judgments operate
for and against specific people, it follows that each person invoking this judgment-issuing power
must have standing.”).
88. E.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–50 (2016); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
89. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1984) (describing the Supreme Court’s
“premise that article III imposes a stringent standing requirement that the requested remedy, or at
least an injunctive remedy, should redress either the actual injury on which standing is predicated
or some other actionable injury”); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J.
777, 809 (2016) (describing the “right plaintiff principle” as requiring that “[t]he remedy sought
determines a plaintiff’s standing, not just the harm alleged”).
90. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
91. Id. at 97–98.
92. Id. at 111–13.
93. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (noting the “‘fundamental
restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties’”
(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991))).
94. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court
136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam).
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remedial standing to pursue injunctive relief.95 Accordingly, because Texas
demonstrated all the prerequisites for standing, the nationwide injunction
comported with Article III justiciability requirements.
One might resist this conclusion and raise two potential constitutional
objections to the way that the courts adjudicated the deferred action matter.96
First, even though Texas had demonstrated standing, the courts conclusorily
bypassed the standing inquiry for all of the other plaintiffs.97 The “oneplaintiff rule,” which has become entrenched in recent decades, allows courts
to adjudicate the merits of a claim as long as at least one plaintiff has
standing.98 In an incisive article, Professor Aaron Bruhl traces the
development of and criticizes this rule.99 He makes a compelling argument
that only plaintiffs who have affirmatively demonstrated Article III standing
may become parties to a case and thus become subject to a judgment.100 So,
on this view, the courts erred by conferring party status on plaintiffs other
than Texas, but that mistake does not necessarily speak to the propriety of the
nationwide injunction.
A second objection, which is related to but distinct from the first,
concerns the scope of the remedy. This, in fact, cuts to the heart of the
constitutional objection to nationwide injunctions. Opponents essentially
insist that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing (a) to rectify a particular
harm (b) through a particular remedy, which (c) is limited in scope to the
plaintiff’s precise injury.101 According to this argument, even though Texas
had standing to pursue an injunction to abate the harm it experienced, it did
not have standing to seek a remedy that benefited other plaintiffs or wouldbe plaintiffs.
This argument is flawed, though, because standing and the proper scope
of an injunction present distinct questions. In fact, since at least the 1960s,
the Supreme Court has countenanced prophylactic injunctions that remedy

95. Id. at 186.
96. A bevy of prudential objections is also available. This discussion focuses solely on the
Article III objections.
97. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 151 (stating that Article III requires only one party to have standing);
see also id. at 162 (“The states have standing.”).
98. See id. at 151 (quoting the one-plaintiff rule); Bruhl, supra note 9, at 484 (using the term
“one-plaintiff rule” to describe the practice whereby a court may “entertain a multiple-plaintiff
case . . . as long as the court finds that one plaintiff has standing”).
99. See generally Bruhl, supra note 9 (arguing the one-plaintiff rule is “inconsistent with the
Constitution and the larger web of standing doctrine”).
100. See id. at 507 (criticizing the one-plaintiff rule for “elid[ing] the difference between parties
and nonparties”).
101. See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 523–24 (quoting Salazar v. Buono,
559 U.S. 700, 731 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (linking standing with scope of relief)); see also
infra note 106 (critiquing this analysis).
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more than the specific harm that a given plaintiff has alleged.102 For example,
in Brown v. Plata,103 the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction that
effectively compelled California to reduce its prison population.104 The
structural injunction sought to redress not only the harm experienced by
prisoners who had actually received constitutionally deficient medical care
but to reform the conditions that created an “extensive and ongoing
constitutional violation.”105 In other words, the injunction swept broadly in
order to prevent other prisoners from experiencing the same deprivation.
Although prophylactic injunctions have been controversial, they remain
part of the constellation of standing doctrine. While a plaintiff indeed must
demonstrate standing to sue regarding a specific injury and standing to seek
a particular remedy, it does not follow that courts—as a matter of
constitutional imperative—may fashion relief that benefits only that
plaintiff.106 So, even if the courts in the deferred action litigation had

102. See Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 312–15 (2004) (noting that “in order
to prevent continuing or recurring harm, the court will address affiliated conduct that contributes to
the harm in order to avert future wrongs” and citing quintessential examples).
103. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
104. Id. at 545.
105. Id.
106. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (“Once invoked, ‘the scope of a district
court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies.’” (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977))). Professors Coan
and Marcus argue that the logic of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
555 U.S. 488 (2009), linked a plaintiff’s standing with the scope of appropriate relief. See Andrew
Coan & David Marcus, Article III, Remedies, and Representation, 9 CONLAWNOW 97, 101–02
(2018). In Summers, a plaintiff had standing to seek an injunction against a salvage-timber sale in a
forest that he visited. 555 U.S. at 494. Because the parties settled their dispute with respect to that
forest, the Court found that the plaintiff could not then challenge timber sales in other forests. Id. A
plausible reading of Summers is that the extent of a plaintiff’s standing-conferring injury necessarily
determines both the kind and extent of relief that a plaintiff may pursue. Indeed, Justices Scalia and
Thomas have understood Summers to stand for that proposition. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S.
700, 731 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“A plaintiff cannot sidestep Article III’s
requirements by combining a request for injunctive relief for which he has standing with a request
for injunctive relief for which he lacks standing.”).
Although the argument that Coan and Marcus proffer and that Justice Scalia similarly advocated
might make good theoretical sense, it is hard to reconcile with prophylactic injunctions. Justice
Scalia likely would have responded: “Exactly my point!” See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 555–
57 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing structural injunctions). But such injunctions remain
part of the remedial landscape. Moreover, a majority of the Court seems to square this circle by
insisting that, while a plaintiff must have standing to seek a particular kind of relief (e.g., an
injunction), the extent of relief that a court may grant remains far more flexible. See, e.g., Salazar,
559 U.S. at 713 (plurality opinion) (arguing that extent of relief concerned the merits, not standing).
Thus, in Salazar v. Buono, Justices Scalia and Thomas were alone in reading Summers to demand
that a plaintiff demonstrate standing to justify the extent of relief sought.
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scrupulously adhered to standing principles (say, by recognizing Texas as the
only proper plaintiff), they still had power to issue a sweeping injunction.107
So too, in other contexts, courts frequently take cognizance of
nonparties when they issue rulings and order relief. For example, they create
precedent that very clearly—and quite intentionally—governs the rights and
obligations of nonparties.108 Furthermore, nonmutual preclusion often allows
someone to take advantage of a judgment in an earlier case in which that
person did not participate.109
Part II explores these parallels more fully, but for present purposes it
suffices to note that a plaintiff’s standing does not delimit the scope of a
court’s injunctive power. Indeed, there are crucial differences between an
actual party (who may, for example, enforce an injunction through contempt
proceedings) and a nonparty who benefits from an injunction more indirectly
(whether through precedent, preclusion, or a nationwide injunction).
Accordingly, even though standing requires a plaintiff to assert his or her
own interests, a court’s remedial power may extend beyond the plaintiff
without impinging on Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.
3. Law Declaration versus Dispute Resolution.—Another way to
appreciate that nationwide injunctions do not run afoul of the judicial power
is to situate them within a familiar theoretical debate about two models of
adjudication. The dispute-resolution model is party driven and posits that a
court’s proper role is to resolve the parties’ concrete dispute, such that any
pronouncements of law are merely incidental to that task. By contrast, the
law-declaration model focuses on the courts—the Supreme Court, in
particular—and treats the parties’ dispute as a vehicle for declaring and
clarifying law.110
Those who argue that nationwide injunctions transgress the judicial
power quite clearly invoke the principles of the dispute-resolution model.
They understand the judicial power to permit courts to adjudicate only the
parties’ actual disputes. Concomitantly, they suggest that courts have “no

107. See Bruhl, supra note 9, at 513 (“[I]t is possible that the district court might have issued a
universal injunction even if Texas had sued as a lone plaintiff and the court made no assumptions
about other states.”). In fact, the actual injunction was truly nationwide in scope, applying
everywhere, not just in Texas or the other states that had challenged the policy.
108. Coan & Marcus, supra note 106, at 105–06.
109. See infra subpart II(B) (describing nonmutual preclusion and its relevance to nationwide
injunctions).
110. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 73–75 (7th ed. 2015); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoidance, Agenda Control,
and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012).
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constitutional basis to decide disputes and issue remedies for those who are
not parties.”111
Although the dispute-resolution and law-declaration models are not
hermetically sealed categories, the Supreme Court has conspicuously
embraced important tenets and attributes of law declaration.112 The Court
never addresses the distinction directly. Nonetheless, even as it continues to
talk the talk of dispute resolution—insisting, for example, that plaintiffs
present disputes that are “both ‘concrete and particularized’”113—the Court
for decades implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) has embraced a more
capacious role.
Partly driving the move toward law declaration was the evolving nature
of law that courts adjudicated. The expansion of both the administrative
state114 and constitutional rights shifted the nature of adjudication from a
purely private enterprise to a more public, “‘political-legal’ undertaking.”115
The expanded mechanisms by which citizens could enforce public law,
including a revitalized § 1983116 and the modern class action, further spurred
the move.117
In recent years, the Supreme Court has embraced more fully its power
to declare the law by exercising even greater control over its agenda, rather
than simply adjudicating cases as the parties have presented them. It
selectively enforces issue-forfeiture rules so that it can adjudicate precisely
what it wants to decide118 and requires parties to brief new issues that the
Court itself has added.119 Perhaps nowhere is this tendency toward agenda
control more evident than the Court’s willingness to appoint amici curiae to
argue matters that the parties themselves do not actually contest.120
While some commentators might quibble that federal courts (and the
Supreme Court, in particular) should be more attentive to resolving actual
disputes, such criticisms neglect the broader phenomenon that much of

111. Bray, supra note 2, at 471; see also Bruhl, supra note 9, at 519 (similarly arguing that
courts properly exercise judicial power only when according relief to actual parties).
112. Monaghan, supra note 110, at 668–69, 683.
113. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)) (emphasis added).
114. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1265, 1282–84 (1961).
115. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and the When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1369 (1973).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (articulating standards for certifying classes in federal court).
118. Monaghan, supra note 110, at 680.
119. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 464 (2009); Monaghan, supra
note 110, at 680.
120. See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1953
(2016) (elucidating this phenomenon); Monaghan, supra note 110, at 680 (same).
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constitutional and administrative adjudication is inherently an act of law
declaration. Admittedly, not every federal court should view its primary task
as law declaration, which might be the unique province of the Supreme Court.
The point is not that law declaration describes how every court approaches
every case. Rather, judicial power is not, by definition, synonymous with
dispute resolution.
To the extent that courts issue nationwide injunctions too profligately,
they are still exercising the judicial power. The problem is simply that courts
have not shown good prudential restraint.
II.

The Preclusion Model
The ultimate normative question that the current debate raises is when,
if ever, courts should issue nationwide injunctions. If I am correct that no
constitutional or structural impediments exist, the question becomes entirely
prudential.
This Part briefly addresses why preclusion is uniquely suited to provide
useful answers and then lays out the essential analogy between nationwide
injunctions and preclusion (specifically, offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion). It then considers the extent to which United States v. Mendoza,
in which the Supreme Court disapproved certain uses of preclusion against
the government, constrains both of these doctrines. This Part draws on the
logic underlying Mendoza as well as the practice of nonacquiescence—when
the government disagrees with a judicial interpretation of the law and
declines to abide by it prospectively. In doing so, it demonstrates that
preclusion principles suggest a coherent theory of when nationwide
injunctions are appropriate. Part III then applies that theory to concrete
examples, showing how the various strands of the theory fit together
cohesively.
A.

Why Preclusion?
Drawing on the theory and doctrine of preclusion, rather than equity
itself, might seem counterintuitive at first. After all, equity long has called
for providing “complete relief” to an aggrieved party, even when doing so
requires injunctions that apply beyond the actual parties to a lawsuit.121
Moreover, since the 1960s, courts have routinely issued prophylactic
injunctions that protect people who have not yet suffered harm from the

121. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (stating that “injunctive relief should
be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs”);
see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (quoting same language
from Yamasaki); Siddique, supra note 20, at 2102–06 (explaining complete-relief principle).
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defendant’s conduct.122 “[C]omplete relief” and prophylactic injunctions are
an important part of the story about nationwide injunctions and help explain
why injunctions sometimes benefit nonparties.123 But they are not the whole
story.
The complete-relief doctrine justifies an injunction that benefits a
nonparty when necessary to vindicate a plaintiff’s rights fully. For example,
if an employee alleges that an employer has illegally underpaid her, and the
reason for the illegal conduct is a widespread practice rather than an isolated
event, an injunction might direct the employer to correct that practice. A
broad injunction properly remedies the precise source of harm, even though
the injunction benefits all employees, not just the specific plaintiff.124 But
complete relief does not address the converse question that nationwide
injunctions often raise: May an injunction ever benefit a nonparty if such
relief is not necessary to give a plaintiff complete relief?125
Similarly, while some scholars have carefully theorized prophylactic
injunctions and identified situations in which they are most legitimate,126
such injunctions are not precisely on point. A prophylactic injunction
regulates conduct that, strictly speaking, is lawful, but the injunction is
arguably necessary to prevent certain harm from recurring.127 For example, a
122. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 102, at 302 (“The prophylactic remedy imposes specific
measures directing defendant’s legal conduct affiliated with the proven wrong to prevent future
harm.”); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1292–302 (1976) (explaining that “the decree sets up an affirmative regime governing the
activities in controversy for the indefinite future and having binding force for persons within its
ambit”); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term––Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 47–49 (1979) (explaining that a structural remedy seeks to remove a threat rather
than eliminate a violation); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635 (1982) (“Federal courts have been asked
with increasing frequency in recent years to grant injunctive decrees that would restructure public
institutions in accordance with what are asserted to be the commands of the federal Constitution.”).
123. See, e.g., Siddique, supra note 20, at 2128–35 (applying the complete-relief doctrine to the
public-law context); see also supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (discussing prophylactic
injunctions and scope of relief).
124. See Siddique, supra note 20, at 2117–19 (explaining why “incidental” nationwide
injunctions are often appropriate when plaintiffs bring claims under the Equal Pay Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
125. For example, if one plaintiff who challenged the Trump Administration’s first travel ban
receives a favorable judgment, complete relief arguably requires only that the plaintiff (but no one
else) receive permission to enter the country.
126. E.g., Fletcher, supra note 122; David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A
Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627
(1988); Thomas, supra note 102; see also Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 706–23 (1978) (applying separation of powers
analysis to guide federal equitable remedies against states).
127. Thomas, supra note 102, at 314–15; see also Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding
Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 936–37
(1999) (arguing that prophylactic injunctions, while not constitutionally required, seek to balance a
case’s competing interests); Schoenbrod, supra note 126, at 678 (arguing that some injunctions
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court might direct an employer that has maintained a hostile work
environment to adopt anti-harassment policies or a complaint procedure in
order to prevent future sexual harassment.128 The injunction regulates
affiliated lawful conduct rather than the direct source of the harm. In the case
of nationwide injunctions, though, a court enjoins conduct that it has already
found to be unlawful. So, while prophylactic injunctions and nationwide
injunctions are related, they actually raise different concerns as to their
purpose, scope, and legitimacy.
Preclusion, by contrast, addresses the fundamental problem of
nationwide injunctions head on. Its singular purpose is to determine who is
and is not bound by the results of litigation.129 And it grapples directly with
the circumstances under which a nonparty may take advantage of a judgment,
irrespective of whether a party has already received complete relief.
B.

Nonmutual Preclusion and Its Limits
One way to conceptualize a nationwide injunction is that when a court
rules in favor of a plaintiff who has sued the government, the court grants
relief to everyone else who could have been (but was not) a plaintiff in that
lawsuit. This is strikingly similar to how nonmutual preclusion works. A sues
the government (say, alleging that a statute is unconstitutional) and wins. B,
who did not participate in the first lawsuit, then sues the government and
argues that issue preclusion prevents the government from relitigating the
constitutionality of the statute.
Under both scenarios—a nationwide injunction and nonmutual
preclusion—B does not actually have to litigate whether the statute is
constitutional but simply piggybacks on A’s victory. From B’s perspective,
the result is the same. The most significant difference between the two
scenarios is that in one (preclusion), B eventually becomes a party to a
lawsuit; in the other (nationwide injunctions), B is never a party. As discussed
later, this difference does not justify rejecting nationwide injunctions
altogether.130 Nonparties often may benefit from legal proceedings.
Unpacking the analogy in a careful way involves parsing some of the
particulars of preclusion, including certain limitations that complicate the
basic analogy between preclusion and nationwide injunctions. Specifically,
this requires attention to the old rule of mutuality and the move away from
it; the difference between defensive and offensive nonmutual issue
“prohibit the defendant from carrying on otherwise lawful conduct in a way that goes beyond the
plaintiff’s rightful position”).
128. Thomas, supra note 102, at 315.
129. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 19–20 (observing that preclusion identifies who was a
“party” to a prior litigation and when nonparties may “be saddled with the burdens, or enjoy the
benefits, of the outcome of a prior adjudication”).
130. See infra subpart III(C).
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preclusion (including the unique problems that the latter presents); and the
distinct concerns that arise in the public-law setting (that is, the Mendoza
problem).
1. Mutuality and Its Demise.—At heart, the preclusion model of
nationwide injunctions rests on the core rule of issue preclusion that someone
who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a matter may not relitigate that
matter in a subsequent lawsuit. As typically articulated, issue preclusion
binds a party when an issue was actually litigated, actually decided, and
essential to the judgment.131
Traditionally, courts also insisted on “mutuality,” meaning that only the
actual parties to a lawsuit, or their privies, could invoke preclusion against
one another in a subsequent lawsuit.132 Now, courts overwhelmingly embrace
the logic of nonmutual preclusion—the idea that someone who was not a
party to an initial lawsuit may invoke preclusion against someone who was a
party. The mutuality requirement never made much sense, given that
preclusion’s primary concern is whether the party to be bound, colloquially
speaking, already had a fair shake.
In the middle of the twentieth century, scholars and courts gradually
came to appreciate both the inefficiency and unfairness of rigidly adhering to
mutuality.133 For example, suppose that A and B litigate a particular question
(say, whether A was negligent), and A loses. In a second lawsuit—this time
between A and C—a nonparty (C) wants to use preclusion against A. Why
should A get a second chance to litigate whether he was negligent?134 After
all, A already had a full and fair opportunity to contest the matter. The key,
for due process purposes, is whether the party against whom preclusion is
invoked already had his day in court.135 In this hypothetical, A did.
So far, the analogy between nationwide injunctions and preclusion is
straightforward. In both scenarios, the government has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate a matter, and so it may be bound by an adverse
judgment. Because courts sensibly have moved away from the mutuality

131. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27, 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
132. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
133. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 & n.18 (1971);
Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in the Federal Courts, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1968).
134. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942)
(“No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a
party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata
against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.”).
135. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation
of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore
has never had an opportunity to be heard.”).
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requirement, a nonparty may benefit from both preclusion and a nationwide
injunction.
2. The Problems of Offensive Nonmutual Issue Preclusion.—The
analogy becomes more complicated because courts do not always permit
nonmutual preclusion. These limitations on preclusion actually prove quite
productive in identifying when nationwide injunctions are also inappropriate.
As courts gradually relaxed the mutuality requirement, they often
distinguished between defensive and offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.136
The defensive variety allows a defendant, who was not a party to the initial
lawsuit, to invoke preclusion as a shield against a plaintiff who did participate
in the first litigation.137 Defensive nonmutual issue preclusion is largely
unproblematic because it does not create perverse or inefficient incentives.
But it is not especially relevant for present purposes.
Offensive nonmutual issue preclusion offers the closest analogue to
nationwide injunctions, but it is fraught with a number of difficulties. In this
scenario, a plaintiff in a second lawsuit, who did not participate in the first
round of litigation, wants to use preclusion as a sword against a defendant
who already lost once before. This form of preclusion is problematic in many
of the same ways that nationwide injunctions can be.
To begin to see the potential pitfalls, consider Professor Brainerd
Currie’s famous example of a train crash that gives rise to lawsuits by fifty
passengers against the railroad.138 Passenger A sues for negligence, and A
loses. Then B sues and loses. And so on down the line until the tenth
passenger, J, manages to win. All of the remaining passengers (K, L, M, etc.)
then will want to take advantage of the single favorable verdict that J won—
in an offensive nonmutual posture—to argue that preclusion prevents the
company from relitigating whether it was negligent.
Note the asymmetry here.139 The railroad is never allowed to invoke
preclusion based on the first nine lawsuits, all of which it won. The
passengers whom the company would want to preclude did not participate in
the earlier lawsuits, and, again, preclusion may not apply against someone
who has not yet had a day in court. Yet in theory those same passengers are
136. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 105–10 (tracing this development in the case law).
137. Take a simplified version of Blonder-Tongue, the first case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court approved nonmutual preclusion. 402 U.S. at 349–50. A supposedly owns a patent and sues B
for infringement. B prevails on the ground that the patent is invalid. A then sues C, alleging that C
violated the same (but now invalid) patent. C wants to invoke issue preclusion against A—that is,
prevent A from relitigating whether the patent is valid.
138. Currie, supra note 29, at 281, 285–86.
139. See Michael A. Berch, A Proposal to Permit Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking
Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 511, 530–31 (1979) (describing the problem of preclusive
asymmetry); Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral
Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655, 660 (1980) (same).
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able to invoke preclusion based on the judgment that they like (namely, J’s
victory in establishing the company’s liability) because the company had
participated in that lawsuit.
The train crash hypothetical illustrates three major problems with
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion and, by extension, a nationwide
injunction. First, offensive nonmutual preclusion encourages a wait-and-see
approach. Passengers who do not participate in the early lawsuits can never
be bound by adverse judgments to which they were not parties, yet they can
wait to take advantage of a favorable judgment against the railroad.140
Second, this form of preclusion can exacerbate inconsistent results. In the
hypothetical, the railroad won nine lawsuits, but preclusion would entrench
the result of the tenth lawsuit, which the company lost. This seems perverse
when nine of the ten lawsuits resulted in verdicts favoring the railroad.141
Finally, offensive nonmutual issue preclusion leads to preclusive asymmetry.
The defendant can never use preclusion against the nonparty passengers, but
those nonparty passengers may invoke preclusion to bind the defendant to
the result of the tenth lawsuit.142
Although these obstacles initially led some courts and commentators to
reject offensive nonmutual issue preclusion altogether,143 the better view is
that it is permissible when the potential problems are absent. To put the point
at a high level of abstraction, courts should ensure that applying preclusion
actually respects preclusion’s overarching goals, including fairness and
efficiency.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments reflects the majority rule that
allows offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.144 At the same time, it
highlights circumstances that counsel strongly against applying preclusion.
Most importantly, courts should not allow preclusion if, as in the train crash
hypothetical, there are actually inconsistent judgments.145 Courts also should
consider whether parties have explicitly adopted a wait-and-see approach in

140. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330 (describing the wait-and-see problem); Currie,
supra note 29, at 299 (same).
141. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330 (discussing the fairness problems associated with
offensive preclusion based on decisions inconsistent with prior decisions favorable to defendants);
see also Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 1457, 1466 (1968) (noting the implications of multiple inconsistent judgments).
142. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (noting this due process conundrum).
143. E.g., Currie, supra note 29, at 294; Michael Kimmel, Note, The Impacts of Defensive and
Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1032–37
(1967).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27, 29 Reporter’s Note (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
145. Id. § 29(4).
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order to take advantage of preclusion146 or if a second proceeding affords
different procedural opportunities (for example, more extensive
discovery).147
The majority approach to offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is
eminently sensible. It is attuned to the various ways that such preclusion
might be fundamentally unfair. If circumstances do not suggest any inherent
unfairness, however, compelling reasons suggest that someone who already
enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue should not get a second
shot at relitigating that same issue.
Return to the train hypothetical, but this time imagine that the first three
passengers (A, B, and C) all win their respective lawsuits.148 The results are
consistent, and the railroad has had its day in court (in fact, three times). This
presents a situation in which the remaining passengers arguably should be
able to take advantage of nonmutual issue preclusion and prevent the
company from relitigating whether it was negligent.
All of this continues to support the analogy between nationwide
injunctions and preclusion, and it begins to suggest appropriate limits on
when nationwide injunctions should be available. In both scenarios, courts
should remain cognizant of factors that counsel against preclusion, such as
inconsistent judgments. Just as offensive nonmutual issue preclusion never
applies automatically, so too nationwide injunctions should not issue as a
matter of course.
3. Mendoza.—The biggest challenge for the model is the extent to
which the Supreme Court has circumscribed courts’ power to bind the
government through offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. The policy
concerns just discussed always have to be at the forefront of judges’ thinking,
and those concerns resonate even more clearly when the government is a
defendant. I argue, though, that a thorough understanding of the doctrine
actually suggests that preclusion—and, by extension, nationwide
injunctions—can be viable under certain circumstances. In fact, the
challenges to applying preclusion against the government further crystallize

146. See id. § 29(3) (noting that courts should consider whether “[t]he person seeking to invoke
favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first
action between himself and his present adversary”); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331
(presumptively rejecting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion when “a plaintiff could easily have
joined in the earlier action”).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(2); id. cmt. d. The Restatement lists seven
specific considerations as well as a catch-all reference to “[o]ther compelling circumstances” that
justify relitigation. Id. § 29(8).
148. To avoid complications, also imagine that party joinder is not feasible. Ideally, if it were
feasible, the passengers would simply bring a single lawsuit.
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the factors that courts should consider when contemplating whether to issue
a nationwide injunction.
In United States v. Mendoza, the Supreme Court rejected a private
party’s attempt to invoke issue preclusion against the government.149 Sixtyeight Filipino veterans had alleged in an initial lawsuit that the U.S.
government’s suspension of certain naturalization proceedings in the
Philippines violated their constitutional due process rights.150 The plaintiffs
prevailed, and the government declined to appeal.151 Sergio Mendoza then
brought a separate lawsuit and sought to invoke issue preclusion against the
government on the question of whether the government’s actions were
unconstitutional.152
Although the Supreme Court had approved offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion just a few years earlier,153 it held that Mendoza could not take
advantage of preclusion. The Court identified several potential concerns with
nonmutual preclusion when the government is a party.154
First, it pointed to the sheer volume of litigation in which the United
States is involved, suggesting that the government could be subject to
preclusion far too readily, given its caseload.155 Second, and most important
for present purposes, the Court expressed concern that offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion “would substantially thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular
legal issue.”156 One loss by the government would then allow every other
person to bring a subsequent lawsuit and invoke preclusion. Moreover,
freezing the law based on a single decision would prevent issues from
percolating through the various federal courts of appeals.157 Third, the Court
observed that this freezing effect would force the Solicitor General to appeal
every adverse decision, even though prudential considerations normally
guide which matters the government appeals. Finally, and relatedly, the Court
noted that if the government did have to appeal every adverse ruling, then
different administrations would not have latitude to take different
enforcement positions.158
149. 464 U.S. 154, 155 (1984).
150. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 948 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
151. Id. at 951; see also Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 157 (noting that the government decided not to
appeal the court’s decision in In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans).
152. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 156–57.
153. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
154. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162–63.
155. Id. at 159–60.
156. Id. at 160.
157. See id. (“Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it
receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court
grants certiorari.”).
158. Id. at 161.
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The dominant view of Mendoza is that it categorically rejected any
application of nonmutual preclusion against the government.159 Scholars,
especially when arguing against the propriety of nationwide injunctions,
often describe Mendoza’s holding in similarly unconditional language160 and
contend that if nonmutual issue preclusion against the government is
forbidden, so too nationwide injunctions are inappropriate.161 The logic
suggests that in both situations, only an actual party (but not a nonparty) to a
lawsuit against the government may directly benefit from the government’s
loss. Occasionally, courts make a similar move of rejecting nationwide
injunctions in light of Mendoza.162
The better reading of Mendoza, however, is that it did not categorically
prohibit using nonmutual preclusion against the government. Rather, it
identified a further set of policy considerations that courts should take into
account when assessing whether preclusion—and similarly a nationwide
injunction—is appropriate.

159. See, e.g., Harrell v. U.S. Postal Serv., 445 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has established that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not extend to litigation
against the United States.”); Burlington N.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227,
1232 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[Mendoza] limited the application of offensive non-mutual collateral
estoppel by concluding that it could not be applied against the federal government.”); Kennedy v.
Comm’r, 876 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[N]on-mutual offensive collateral estoppel . . . is
not permitted against the United States government.”); Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant Fla.,
Dep’t of Transp., 768 F.2d 1558, 1578 (11th Cir. 1985) (describing Mendoza as having held that
“nonmutual collateral estoppel should not be applied against the government”); Sun Towers, Inc. v.
Heckler, 725 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing that “nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
cannot be used against the government”); see also 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 4465.4
(noting that even though Mendoza likely did not articulate a categorical rule, “[a] uniform rule,
however, may already be upon us”).
160. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 2, at 464 (“[T]he doctrine of nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion does not apply against the federal government.”); Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra
note 9, at 623–24 (arguing that Mendoza stands for the proposition that “when a federal court
decides an issue adversely to the Government . . . [t]he Government is not bound by that ruling in
subsequent cases involving other people”); see also Frost, supra note 19, at 1112 (rejecting the
analogy of nationwide injunction to Mendoza but describing Mendoza as having held “that offensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel did not apply in litigation against the federal government”). One
scholar, who probably wishes that he could take a mulligan, brashly overstated the strength of
Mendoza’s holding. See Trammell, supra note 43, at 615 (describing Mendoza as having held that
“the United States could never be bound through offensive nonmutual issue preclusion”). Alas.
161. See Bray, supra note 2, at 464 (arguing that Mendoza’s rejection of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion assumes that nationwide injunctions are improper); see also Morley, Nationwide
Injunctions, supra note 9, at 627–33 (arguing that “[t]he compelling considerations that led the
Mendoza Court to refrain from subjecting the Government to nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel likewise counsel strongly against allowing courts to certify nationwide classes”).
162. E.g., California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 583 (9th Cir. 2018); L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664–65 (9th Cir. 2011); Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 393–94 (4th Cir. 2001); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272,
296–97 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manion, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that Mendoza militates against nationwide injunctions).
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First, Mendoza itself lends credence to the idea that the Court did not
articulate a categorical rule but instead focused on the specific problems in
the case at hand. For example, the Court held that “the United States may not
be collaterally estopped on an issue such as this, adjudicated against it in an
earlier lawsuit brought by a different party.”163 In concluding its analysis, the
Court yet again remarked that “nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
simply does not apply against the Government in such a way as to preclude
relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case.”164 Despite this
cagey language, the Court did little to clarify why certain issues might not
lend themselves to nonmutual preclusion but others might.165 Nor has the
Court revisited the substance of Mendoza since then.166
Second, and far more significantly, the inherent logic of Mendoza tracks
the way that courts long have approached nonmutual preclusion questions.
Even as courts abandoned the mutuality requirement and increasingly
embraced nonmutual preclusion, they were careful to identify circumstances
that militate against preclusion. For example, as discussed above, courts
remain attuned to gamesmanship by plaintiffs and inconsistent results from
earlier lawsuits.167 Mendoza identified several other concerns that are unique
to litigation involving the government, but these considerations should not
absolutely foreclose the availability of preclusion. Rather, as with nonmutual
preclusion writ large, courts should be attentive to them. If the concerns are
absent, then preclusion at least should be possible.
Several lower courts have embraced this underlying logic of Mendoza.
For instance, the Second Circuit in Benjamin v. Coughlin168 observed that
Mendoza’s principal policy rationales were “avoidance of premature estoppel
and assurance of an opportunity for the government to consider the
administrative concerns that weigh against initiation of the appellate
process.”169 The Second Circuit noted that the issue before it, unlike in
Mendoza, had percolated through various lower courts and that the

163. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
165. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 4465.4 (describing the questions that Mendoza
left unresolved); A. Leo Levin & Susan M. Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States
Government, 70 IOWA L. REV. 113, 121 (1984) (explaining why Mendoza’s reach is unclear).
166. The Court seemed poised to consider whether an exception to the overarching Mendoza
rule should apply in original-jurisdiction cases, but it ultimately sidestepped the question. See
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1997) (declining to address Mendoza because the
previously litigated issue, which Alaska argued that the United States should be precluded from
relitigating, was not necessary to the original judgment).
167. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (describing majority approach).
168. 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 576.
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government had, in fact, chosen to appeal earlier adverse judgments.170
Nonmutual preclusion against the government was thus appropriate because
the Mendoza concerns had been allayed. Other courts also have embraced the
idea that Mendoza did not articulate an absolute rule, and they too have
applied nonmutual preclusion against the government.171
Opponents of nationwide injunctions are right to draw on the logic of
Mendoza, but they have drawn the wrong inference. Mendoza does not reflect
a categorical approach to nonmutual preclusion against the government. So,
too, nationwide injunctions are not categorically forbidden. Rather, the same
concerns that animated the actual Mendoza case—not wanting to freeze the
law after a single lawsuit, facilitating percolation, and not forcing the
government to appeal every adverse decision—should inform whether a
nationwide injunction is proper.
At this point, the analogy is crystallizing. Nonmutual preclusion
(especially when invoked against the government) and nationwide
injunctions both begin with the fundamental premise that the government has
already had at least one day in court to try to vindicate its position. If the
government loses, basic fairness allows the government to be bound by the
adverse result. But a host of concerns arise when new plaintiffs seek to invoke
preclusion nonmutually or when nonparties benefit from a nationwide
injunction. Those concerns are overwhelmingly the same in the two contexts.
Roughly speaking, they track the considerations that the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments identifies, including a fear of gamesmanship and
inconsistent results,172 as well as the Mendoza problems just discussed.
These considerations suggest when a nationwide injunction is not
appropriate. But they do not identify the standard that should affirmatively
guide courts in deciding that a nationwide injunction is appropriate. That
standard derives from the doctrine and theory of nonacquiescence.
C.

Nonacquiescence
The final piece of the argument in understanding the circumstances
under which nationwide injunctions are appropriate is the practice of
nonacquiescence—when the government refuses to abide by a judicial
170. Id. In Benjamin, the question pertained to preclusion of a state government, but the court
did not rest its decision on that distinction.
171. E.g., DeCastro v. City of New York, 278 F. Supp. 3d 753, 764 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Colo.
Springs Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 666 F. Supp. 1475, 1478–79 (D. Colo. 1987),
appeal dismissed, 848 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1988); Stormont-Vail Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Bowen, 645 F.
Supp. 1182, 1192 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Disimone v. Browner, 121 F.3d 1262, 1267–68 (9th Cir.
1997) (applying nonmutual issue preclusion against the government but without discussing
Mendoza); McQuade v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 137, 145–46 (1985) (applying nonmutual preclusion
against the government because the party invoking preclusion had been “a ‘party’ in all but a
technical sense” to the initial litigation).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(2)–(4) cmt. e, f (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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interpretation of law prospectively. Mendoza enabled, but did not necessarily
require, this practice.173 Even though the Supreme Court did not absolutely
prohibit nonmutual preclusion against the government, it did make clear that
in the mine-run of cases, the government should not be subject to preclusion
in this manner. Thus, the government generally has discretion to relitigate
issues that it has lost. Because of that latitude, the government may decline
to conform its conduct to judicial precedent and instead craft policies and
practices that accord with its contrary view of the law.174
Nonacquiescence is understandably controversial, particularly in certain
manifestations, because it seriously challenges separation-of-powers ideals
and seems to allow the government to ignore judicial interpretations of law.175
Some scholars have offered a qualified defense of nonacquiescence in its
most problematic form,176 and that defense can guide judges as they grapple
with nationwide injunctions. Specifically, this theory can train judges’
thinking on whether law is settled and whether the government is behaving
in good faith.
Scholars who have written about nonacquiescence generally focus on
federal administrative agencies, although the concept usefully applies more
broadly. The practice comes in several variants, but two appear most relevant
here. First, with intercircuit nonacquiescence, the government pursues its
preferred policies and interpretation of law in one circuit, even though the
court of appeals for another circuit has rejected the government’s position.177
Second, intracircuit nonacquiescence entails the government’s refusal to

173. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 685 (“One can well imagine a legal regime under
which the agency must internalize the relevant judicial decisions, but where it can challenge the
precedent through a declaratory judgment action.”).
174. See Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1341–42 (1991) (“Intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when executive-branch
decision makers refuse to follow a circuit court’s precedents even when acting subject to that
circuit’s, and no other circuit’s, power of judicial review.”); Ross E. Davies, Remedial
Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 67 (2003) (offering one definition of nonacquiescence as
“the refusal of agencies of the federal government to conform their policies and practices to federal
circuit court precedent”); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 681 (defining nonacquiescence as
“[t]he selective refusal of administrative agencies to conduct their internal proceedings consistently
with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals”).
175. See Coenen, supra note 174, at 1357–61 (“Courts and scholars widely agree that the key
constitutional question concerning intracircuit nonacquiescence is whether the practice transgresses
the so-called ‘separation of powers principle.’”); Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99
YALE L.J. 801, 822–25 (1990) (rooting the “separation of powers objections” to nonacquiescence
in courts’ power to declare the law); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and
Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1830–32 (1989) (arguing that administrative
nonacquiescence poses a separation of powers problem because agencies, like courts, perform an
adjudicatory function).
176. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 752–53.
177. Davies, supra note 174, at 71.
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abide by the case law of the court that will review the government’s
actions.178
Intercircuit nonacquiescence is overwhelmingly uncontroversial.179
Under the current organization of regional federal circuits, the notion that
each court of appeals is allowed to develop its own case law and is not bound
to follow the precedents of sister circuits has become almost axiomatic.180
That each circuit may create its own precedents is unexceptional, as
evidenced by the ubiquity of circuit splits.181 Indeed, the Supreme Court
explicitly relies on such splits in identifying issues that merit the Court’s
attention.182 So, the idea that the government might conform its actions to the
law in one circuit but pursue a competing vision of the law in another circuit
is unobjectionable, perhaps to the point of banality. Even scholars who object
to other forms of nonacquiescence essentially concede the point.183
Intracircuit nonacquiescence is a different beast altogether. Expressly
ignoring circuit law—especially when the government is acting within that
very circuit—raises the specter of lawlessness.184 A prominent example that
several commentators have discussed involved the Social Security
Administration’s policy of terminating recipients’ benefits, even if the
178. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 687; Berger, supra note 9, at 1098. A third variant
is particular to administrative law—venue-choice nonacquiescence—which essentially involves an
agency’s refusal to abide by one circuit’s case law when there is uncertainty whether the court of
appeals for that circuit or some other circuit will review the agency’s actions. Estreicher & Revesz,
supra note 26, at 687.
179. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 174, at 71 (noting that “[p]ractically no one objects” to
intercircuit nonacquiescence and calling the practice “little more than a fancy term to describe the
routine behavior of anyone whose actions are subject to review in federal court”); see also Estreicher
& Revesz, supra note 26, at 735–36 (discussing how the “lack of intercircuit stare decisis” bolsters
the premise that “intercircuit nonacquiescence should not be constrained”); Berger, supra note 9, at
1099 (noting that “[t]he practice of nonacquiescence is as old as the administrative state itself” and
is “widely accepted by courts and commentators”).
180. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) (permitting each
court of appeals to develop its own circuit case law); cf. Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among
Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 686 (1984) (arguing
that Congress might not have expressly intended for courts to create independent law of the circuit).
181. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605,
614–18 (2003) (describing prevalent circuit splits); Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A
Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 681, 719–20 (1984) (same); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit
Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1144–47 (2012) (same).
182. SUP. CT. R. 10.
183. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 175, at 802 n.8 (noting that “[i]ntercircuit
nonacquiescence has not been very controversial and has not led to criticism from the courts”);
Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of
Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 490 (1986) (“To a large extent, the structure of American
appellate courts appears to approve of and even demand intercircuit nonacquiescence . . . .”).
184. The government, of course, must abide by the judgment of cases in which it loses.
Nonacquiescence involves how the government conducts itself prospectively.
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agency did not marshal evidence that the recipients’ medical conditions had
improved.185 The agency explicitly acknowledged that its policy contravened
two Ninth Circuit opinions;186 nonetheless, it asserted the right not to abide
by the courts’ interpretations of the relevant statute, even when administering
the program in the Ninth Circuit.187
Courts have tended to react with umbrage when an agency, despite
repeated losses before a court of appeals, continues to reject—and fails to
conform to—that court’s interpretation of the law.188 Similarly, most scholars
who have addressed the issue regard intracircuit nonacquiescence as
illegitimate.189
In one of the seminal discussions of this practice, though, Professors
Samuel Estreicher and Richard Revesz offer a rare and insightful defense of
intracircuit nonacquiescence.190 Although they focus on the administrative
law setting, the core of their qualified defense turns on factors that apply to
the government’s litigation choices more broadly and should inform the
parameters of nationwide injunctions. In essence, the government may
justifiably choose not to acquiesce when the law is unsettled and when the
government genuinely seeks to vindicate its position. More concretely, the
government must have a “justifiable basis” for believing that its interpretation
of the law ultimately will prevail.191 Furthermore, the government must
actively seek such vindication, for example by candidly articulating its view
of the law and appealing adverse decisions.192
The converse of this defense is critical. When the government does not
act in good faith to vindicate its view of the law, failing to abide by judicial
precedent becomes an act of bad faith. Thus, if the law is no longer in flux,
the government must conform its actions to settled law.
185. E.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 699–700; Maranville, supra note 183, at 488
n.55.
186. Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982); Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340
(9th Cir. 1981).
187. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (detailing the Secretary’s explicit
nonacquiescence), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 469 U.S.
1082 (1984).
188. See Davies, supra note 174, at 76 (observing that courts of appeals “expect obedience” to
their interpretations and regard intracircuit nonacquiescence as “lawlessness”); Estreicher &
Revesz, supra note 26, at 710–11, 711 n.165 (noting that nearly every court of appeals has
disapproved intracircuit nonacquiescence); Schwartz, supra note 175, at 1823 n.23 (collecting
cases).
189. E.g., Coenen, supra note 174, at 1432–34; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 175, at 803;
Schwartz, supra note 175, at 1830.
190. Some of their arguments rest on factors unique to federal agencies, including agencies’
responsibility to adopt and implement nationwide policies as well as their singular power to create
and adjudicate law. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 753–54 (discussing agencies that
have nationwide policymaking authority and Chevron deference flowing from organic statutes).
191. Id. at 754–56.
192. Id. at 755–56.
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III. A Preclusion-Based Theory of Nationwide Injunctions
Based on the theory and doctrine of preclusion and nonacquiescence,
this Part articulates and defends a theory of nationwide injunctions that
comprises two mirror-image standards. First, courts presumptively should
not issue nationwide injunctions, thereby allowing the law to develop in the
usual iterative way. Second, courts may issue nationwide injunctions for the
benefit of nonparties if plaintiffs can demonstrate that the government is
behaving in bad faith, most notably when government officials fail to abide
by settled law.
Although I focus on the symbiosis between nationwide injunctions and
preclusion, this Part also situates nationwide injunctions within several other
important developments. Most importantly, it defends the preclusion-based
theory of nationwide injunctions against the most trenchant criticism of the
analogy—namely, that there is a fundamental difference between parties and
nonparties.
A.

The Standard to Govern Nationwide Injunctions
The two-part standard that should determine when a nationwide
injunction is appropriate derives from preclusion and, in particular, the theory
of nonacquiescence. When the government loses a single case, it does not
have to capitulate at once but instead may actively relitigate unsettled legal
questions. One lower-court decision typically does not resolve a matter
forever after, and the government may, in good faith, advance its alternative
view of the law in future litigation.
Accordingly, when a court finds that a statute, regulation, or policy is
unlawful, it should not immediately resort to a nationwide injunction.
Presumptively, any relief should benefit only the parties to the case. This
presumption gives the government an opportunity to vindicate its
interpretation of a given statute, regulation, or policy. It also affords different
courts an opportunity to consider the matter and thus facilitates the
percolation of the issue.
Conversely, when the government acts in bad faith, a nationwide
injunction is entirely appropriate in order to vindicate equality and rule-oflaw norms.193 The usual way that plaintiffs can demonstrate governmental
bad faith is by showing that the law is no longer in flux—most obviously,
when the Supreme Court has conclusively resolved a particular question—
yet the government fails to abide by that settled law.
Other avenues for demonstrating bad faith are also available. Probably
the clearest example of this is when the government does not actively seek to
vindicate its position in the courts. Thus, the government’s consistent failure

193. See infra notes 214–22 and accompanying text.
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to appeal adverse trial court decisions—and instead just absorb relatively
minor losses—can provide evidence of bad faith.194 Such a situation could
arise when the government is indifferent to whether a policy is lawful (or
perhaps even knows that it is unlawful) and is essentially trying to run out the
clock on legal challenges. In that scenario, the government does not actively
litigate its legal position but instead simply waits until the policy becomes
effectively entrenched.
Nationwide injunctions might also be appropriate even when the
government is not, strictly speaking, acting in bad faith. If the quintessential
example of bad faith in this context is flouting clearly established law, a broad
injunction might also be justifiable when the law is, so to speak, settled
enough.195 The government could still genuinely try to vindicate its view of
the law in other courts, but the law becomes sufficiently clear that the onus
should fall on the government to prove that its view is correct. One such
example, discussed in greater detail below, involves the litigation over the
first travel ban.196 Every court to consider the matter concluded that certain
parts of the ban were blatantly illegal, as the White House eventually
conceded. A nationwide injunction was appropriate, even though the
Supreme Court had not stepped in. The law was sufficiently settled—against
the government—such that the burden then fell appropriately on the
government, rather than those affected by the travel ban, to defend the
policy’s legality.
B.

Settled Law and Bad Faith
The most conspicuous example of bad faith, and thus the touchstone for
when a nationwide injunction becomes most appropriate, is when the
government fails to abide by settled law.197 This raises the critical question
of how courts should operationalize the theory proposed here. In other words,
how settled is “settled”?

194. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 756 (“[A]n agency that persistently declines to
seek appellate review in circuits that have not yet ruled on the legality of its position is not
reasonably seeking to vindicate that position in the courts of appeals.”).
195. See id. at 727 (“[E]ven in the absence of Supreme Court review, at some point the law in
a particular circuit and across circuits will no longer be in flux.”).
196. See infra notes 219–24 and accompanying text.
197. “Bad faith” is notoriously difficult to define and remains largely unexplored in the publiclaw setting. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 890–92 (2016).
David Pozen has explored various conceptions of constitutional bad faith, including subjective and
objective versions. See generally id. at 918–34 (describing categories and examples of subjective
and objective bad faith). The example of bad faith with which I am primarily concerned, failure to
abide by settled law, fits comfortably into what he describes as one paradigm of subjective bad
faith—”usurpation of another actor’s constitutional prerogatives by deliberately violating
constitutional constraints or disregarding constitutional duties.” Id. at 922 (emphasis removed).
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There are various ways to approach this question, but a useful starting
point is to think about situations in which the law is unsettled—that is, when
a nationwide injunction is inappropriate. Earlier, I discussed several factors
that should give courts pause before they apply nonmutual issue preclusion
generally as well as additional policy considerations specific to the
government (that is, the Mendoza factors). These considerations help identify
scenarios when shutting down litigation might be premature. In other words,
they are the prudential concerns that indicate when the law is not settled and
that militate against a nationwide injunction.
Chief among these prudential concerns is whether different courts that
have considered the same matter have reached different results. To my mind,
this is the core concern with offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.198 In the
face of actually inconsistent results (as, for example, in the train crash
hypothetical discussed earlier), nonmutual preclusion becomes acutely
problematic because it would entrench only one of those outcomes. Actually
inconsistent results are probably the single best indicator that the law remains
unsettled.
Another situation in which courts and scholars justifiably worry that the
law remains in flux is the one-and-done scenario—when only a single court
has considered a particular question and that court’s decision becomes
binding everywhere. This was the central fear in Mendoza. The Court
explicitly observed that allowing nonmutual preclusion against the
government “would substantially thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular
legal issue.”199 Opponents of nationwide injunctions similarly have expressed
concern that such injunctions freeze the first decision that results in a loss for
the government.200 At its core, the one-and-done problem is that a single
lower court’s ruling does not genuinely settle an issue.
Relatedly, to the extent that the first court’s decision of an issue can
become widely binding through either preclusion or a nationwide injunction,
plaintiffs have an incentive to engage in forum shopping.201 In fact, strong
evidence suggests that litigants challenging Bush- and Trump-era policies
channeled cases to courts in the Ninth Circuit, whereas challenges to Obama
Administration policies not only proceeded in Texas courts but sometimes

198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (noting that
preclusion is contraindicated when “[t]he determination relied on as preclusive was itself
inconsistent with another determination of the same issue”).
199. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
200. Bray, supra note 2, at 419, 462–65; see also Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note
9, at 533 (noting Mendoza’s concern about freezing the first decision adverse to the government);
Berger, supra note 9, at 1090 (noting the same freezing problem).
201. Bray, supra note 2, at 457–60; Berger, supra note 9, at 1071–72; see also Frost, supra note
19, at 1104–05 (noting the forum shopping objection); Malveaux, supra note 19, at 57 (same).
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before specifically targeted judges.202 Although it has become fashionable for
courts and scholars to inveigh against forum shopping as an inherent evil,203
without more, forum shopping seems no better or worse than other litigation
tactics.204 Sometimes it is completely benign.205 Forum shopping becomes
objectionable only to the extent that it is a symptom of a deeper problem.206
In the case of nationwide injunctions, the deeper problems ultimately
come back to a reluctance to entrench results before the law is truly settled.
If everyone knows, for example, that the first court’s decision of a particular
issue will become widely binding, litigants understandably forum shop, given
the lawsuit’s high stakes. In many ways, the fear of a race to the courthouse
explains two concerns that the Court expressed in Mendoza—the prospect
that the Solicitor General would have to appeal every adverse decision and
that different presidential administrations would no longer have latitude to
adopt different interpretations of law.207 When litigants forum shop and in
effect deprive the government of its normal discretion—with respect to both
litigation and enforcement decisions—this offers strong evidence that the law
is not yet settled.
Finally, the problem of asymmetric preclusion and the strategic behavior
that it can foster also indicate when the law isn’t settled. The asymmetry
comes from the fact that a nonparty may not be bound by an unfavorable
judgment but nonetheless may invoke a favorable one. (Think once again
about the train passengers who are not parties to the initial lawsuits. They
aren’t subject to preclusion if the railroad wins, but they can try to take

202. Berger, supra note 9, at 1092; see also Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court,
Calling It a ‘Disgrace,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/
20/us/politics/trump-appeals-court-ninth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/4F7F-37MW] (describing
forum shopping in challenges to Obama and Trump administration policies).
203. E.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum
Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1054 (2002); Abbe R. Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE
L.J. 1898, 1935, 1982 (2011); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333,
336–37 (2006) (noting that “Congressional efforts to limit forum shopping have portrayed the
practice as abusive, devious, and unethical”).
204. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677, 1683–84, 1695
(1990); see also Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 579, 582–83 (arguing that global forum shopping can promote access to justice,
facilitate substantive enforcement, and facilitate legal reform).
205. For example, a lawyer might prefer federal court because of familiarity with the uniform
rules of federal procedure. Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules:
An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 747 (2006). Perhaps
most significantly, the entire concept of diversity jurisdiction is predicated on forum shopping and
the idea that federal court offers a more hospitable forum to adjudicate certain controversies. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing the diversity jurisdiction head of federal jurisdiction).
206. Alan M. Trammell, Toil and Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became Structurally
Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3249, 3272–73 (2014).
207. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160–61 (1984).
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advantage of cases that the company loses.) This asymmetry can lead
potential plaintiffs not to join early lawsuits and, instead, adopt a wait-andsee approach.208 When plaintiffs do this, they arguably are trying to take
advantage of a single favorable judgment, which likely reflects an unsettled
vision of the law.
To put all of this succinctly, the various factors that should lead courts
to be chary of permitting nonmutual preclusion (including inconsistent
judgments and wait-and-see gamesmanship) as well as the Mendoza factors
(including whether issues have percolated and whether the government has
chosen to appeal adverse judgments) all elucidate whether the law is settled
or not. When these considerations from the preclusion realm suggest that the
law is unsettled, nationwide injunctions are inappropriate.
Conversely, other indicators affirmatively suggest when the law is
settled—namely, when these various concerns are absent. Again, the most
obvious example is when the Supreme Court has conclusively resolved a
matter. If the law is clear and an official knowingly ignores that settled law,
he is often acting in bad faith.209 This presents the paradigmatic situation in
which a nationwide injunction should issue.
But nationwide injunctions can also be appropriate even if an official is
not technically behaving in bad faith. If settled law is the driving force behind
the most conspicuous form of bad faith, there are arguably situations in which
the law can be settled enough to justify a broad injunction. The question is
not whether all doubt ceases to exist. Rather, the law must be sufficiently
clear to demand that the government conform its behavior and enforcement
positions to that settled law, even if the government continues to pursue its
alternative view of the law in court. Nationwide injunctions can be especially
appropriate when various courts rule in favor of plaintiffs challenging
governmental action and grant the same provisional relief. As discussed
below, litigation over the first travel ban offers a nice example. In this
situation, the injunction effectively shifts the burden to the government to
demonstrate why, pending resolution of the merits questions, it should be
allowed to continue enforcing a statute or policy.
Reasonable people can differ about the degree of clarity that is necessary
within lower courts before a nationwide injunction should issue, but a good
rule of thumb is a “rule of three.” The Department of Justice apparently has
adopted an unofficial house rule that if at least three courts of appeals have
considered a given question and all reached the same result, then the
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (noting that
preclusion is contraindicated when “[t]he person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid
unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his
present adversary”).
209. See Pozen, supra note 197, at 922–25 (describing examples of bad faith situations in which
officials knowingly overstep their bounds and usurp other officials’ or institutions’ authority).
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government treats the law as settled and conforms to those rulings
nationwide.210 The D.C. Circuit similarly has found this to be a useful rule of
thumb.211 Adapting the rule of three to the context of nationwide injunctions,
a court could conclude that the law is sufficiently settled when three different
district courts, ideally in different circuits, have adopted the same view of
the law.
A rule of three allays nearly all of the concerns discussed above. Most
obviously, insisting that at least three courts rule on a question before a
nationwide injunction may issue obviates the one-and-done problem that has
animated Mendoza and scholarly objections to the nationwide injunction. If
three different district courts in different circuits have ruled on a question,
then there is the potential for percolation. Even if the government has to
conform its (nationwide) conduct to the rulings, it still has the opportunity to
pursue appeals, including to the Supreme Court. In other words, this rule of
thumb consciously facilitates percolation, such that there is little risk of
prematurely freezing the law.
Relatedly, a rule of three significantly reduces (even if it does not
eliminate) the extreme pressure to forum shop. True, a plaintiff might still try
to select an especially favorable court or judge to rule on a question. The
stakes are much lower, though, if courts may not issue a nationwide
injunction until something of a judicial consensus has emerged. Similarly,
because everything no longer rides on a single district court’s decision, the
Solicitor General will retain discretion to choose whether to appeal some
adverse decisions.
In a subtle but important way, a rule of three alleviates preclusive
asymmetry—the problem that no matter how many times a defendant wins
individual cases, those wins can never apply universally but even a single
loss could.212 The rule of three would not necessarily allow the governmentdefendant to shut down challenges based on its legal victories, but it would
210. See Paul D. Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical Study,
11 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (1974) (noting that while the government “does not regard a decision
of the United States Court of Appeals as authoritative . . . [i]t appears to be the house rule of the
Justice Department that three unanimous Courts of Appeals decisions are sufficient to establish
authoritatively that a government position is wrong”). Relatedly, Judge Posner has argued that
“when the first three circuits to decide an issue have decided it the same way, the remaining circuits
should defer to that decision.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 381 (1996).
211. See Johnson v. U.S.R.R. Ret. Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[N]ow that three
circuits have rejected the Board’s position, and not one has accepted it, further resistance would
show contempt for the rule of law. After ten years of percolation, it is time for the Board to smell
the coffee.”); cf. Samuel Figler, Nonacquiescence: Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial
Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664, 1684–87 (1993) (criticizing the “three-strike rule” as
arbitrary and problematic).
212. At the risk of flogging a dead horse: Think once more about the railroad in Currie’s train
crash hypothetical.
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prevent a nationwide injunction from issuing if the government’s position has
prevailed in at least one case. Another way to put the point is that a rule of
three is sensitive to the problem of actually inconsistent results and prevents
one plaintiff-friendly ruling from becoming entrenched in the face of actual
victories by the government.
C.

Applying the Theory
The following four scenarios illustrate how the theory developed here
can and should apply in practice.
First, consider the case of Kim Davis, the local clerk in Rowan County,
Kentucky, who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples on
account of her religious objections to same-sex marriage. The Supreme Court
had recently decided Obergefell v. Hodges,213 which clearly articulated that
same-sex couples enjoy an equal constitutional right to marry.214 True, Kim
Davis had not been an actual party to the Obergefell lawsuit, but the Supreme
Court’s holding was clear beyond peradventure. Accordingly, four couples
sued Davis, and the district court granted a preliminary injunction in the
plaintiffs’ favor.215 Several weeks later, the court clarified that the injunction
applied to everyone in Rowan County, Kentucky, including those who were
not parties to any lawsuits.
The court explained its reasoning as follows:
[I]t soon became apparent that Davis denied marriage license requests
submitted by other couples, including, but not limited to, Plaintiffs in
two companion cases before this Court. Had the Court declined to
clarify that its ruling applied to all eligible couples seeking a marriage
license in Rowan County, it would have effectively granted Plaintiffs’
request for injunctive relief and left other eligible couples at the mercy
of Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy, which the Court found to be
in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.
Such an approach would not only create piecemeal litigation, it would
be inconsistent with basic principles of justice and fairness.216
The Davis episode offers a classic example of settled law and a
government official who behaved in bad faith by knowingly refusing to apply
that law. An injunction that expressly benefited all similarly situated

213. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
214. Id. at 2607 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry in all States.”).
215. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
216. Miller v. Davis, No. 15–44–DLB, 2015 WL 9460311, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015)
(citations omitted).
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nonparties was wholly appropriate. In some ways, this is the quintessential
scenario that justifies a broad injunction.217
Second, the initial version of the so-called travel ban that President
Trump promulgated a week after his inauguration218 led to litigation that
quickly gave rise to consensus, at least with respect to certain issues. Most
famously, the executive order suspended entry into the United States by any
national of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.219 Various
plaintiffs, including several lawful permanent residents (“green card”
holders), challenged the executive order. Five courts quickly granted
nationwide injunctions in the form of temporary restraining orders or stays,
which prevented the Trump Administration from enforcing the order.220 The
President’s legal authority to ban green card holders from returning to the
United States was especially dubious, as even the Administration soon
recognized.221
The courts unanimously determined that a preliminary injunction
restraining enforcement of the first iteration of the travel ban was proper,
particularly as applied to lawful permanent residents. The rule of three thus
suggested that the law was settled as to the appropriateness of a temporary
restraining order. Although the first and second courts to consider the
question probably should not have issued nationwide injunctions, by the time
that the third, fourth, and fifth courts reached the same conclusion, broad
relief was proper, particularly given the provisional nature of the relief. It
allowed even nonparties to benefit from the judicial consensus. By the same
token, the multiplicity of live lawsuits also ensured that the issue could
percolate through the courts of appeals.

217. Note that, strictly speaking, it is not an injunction that literally extends everywhere in the
nation, because the purview of Davis’s authority was only within Rowan County, Kentucky. As
explained in the introduction, though, this is still within the rubric of the injunctions denominated
as “nationwide injunctions” because it is directed at the defendants and expressly applies to
nonparties.
218. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
219. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (“Among other actions,
Executive Order 13769 suspended for 90 days the entry of certain aliens from seven countries: Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.”).
220. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 3, 2017); Mohammed v. United States, No. CV 17–00786 AB (PLAx), 2017 WL 438750, at
*1–2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017); Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 17–CV–10154, 2017 WL 386550, at *1
(D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017); Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17–CV–116, 2017 WL 386549, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 28, 2017); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CIV. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2017).
221. See Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (D. Mass. 2017) (“On February 1, 2017,
the White House distributed a memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State, the Acting Attorney
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security clarifying that Sections 3(c) and 3(e) of the EO do
not apply to lawful permanent residents.”).
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Recognizing that the first executive order was legally problematic,
President Trump revised the order twice.222 Although most courts continued
to find that injunctions were appropriate, they did not reach the same degree
of consensus that courts had when considering the first travel ban.223
Moreover, the Supreme Court ultimately determined, against the weight of
the lower courts’ conclusions, that a preliminary injunction was
unwarranted.224 The lack of consensus with respect to the second and third
iterations of the travel ban suggested that nationwide injunctions were
inappropriate in those situations.
Third, consider the initial challenge to President Trump’s directive that
prohibited transgender persons from joining the military and called for the
dismissal of transgender persons who were already serving.225 Eight plaintiffs
brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia.226 In finding
that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of their constitutional
challenges to certain facets of the policy, the judge issued a preliminary
injunction.227 Rather than granting relief only to the eight plaintiffs in the
lawsuit, the judge issued a nationwide injunction, preventing the
Administration from enforcing the key aspects of the policy against anyone.
This is what the Court in Mendoza and opponents of nationwide
injunctions feared—that the first court to resolve a matter against the
government could freeze the law and thwart percolation. Under the theory
developed here, a nationwide injunction was premature. Thus, the court
should have granted relief only to the eight actual plaintiffs in the lawsuit and
given other courts an opportunity to weigh in.
Subsequent developments, though, illustrate exactly how the rule of
three can apply most fruitfully. Three other lawsuits also challenged the
transgender service ban, and in each case, federal courts in Maryland,
Washington, and California issued nationwide preliminary injunctions.228

222. Proclamation No. 9645, 3 C.F.R. 2017, Comp., pp. 135–36 (Sept. 24, 2017) (third
iteration); Exec. Order No. 13780, supra note 219 (Mar. 6, 2017) (second iteration).
223. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565 (D. Md.),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017)
(refusing to block the second executive order in its entirety, but enjoining Section 2(c) of the order).
But see, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1238–39 (D. Haw.), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (declining to limit
injunction to Section 2(c) of the order, and instead enjoining Sections 2 and 6 in their entirety).
224. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (denying injunction).
225. Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2017).
226. Id. at 185–90.
227. See id. at 207 (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of the Accession and Retention
Directives).
228. Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17–1799 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 9732572, at *16 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 22, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 18-56539 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018); Karnoski v. Trump,
No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017), appeal dismissed, No.
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The four lawsuits did not definitively settle the question of whether the
transgender service ban was constitutional. Far from it, particularly in light
of the Supreme Court’s interest in the matter.229 But the law was settled
enough to put the onus on the government to justify why it should be able to
continue enforcing a policy that four courts had determined was probably
unconstitutional. Because the district courts were in three different circuits
(the D.C., Fourth, and Ninth Circuits), there remained ample opportunity for
percolation and for the government to choose which cases to appeal.
Moreover, the precise nature of the relief (preliminary injunctions) allayed
concerns that courts were prematurely freezing the law. The district courts,
the reviewing courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court all retained the ability
to rule on the merits of the ultimate constitutional questions.
Finally, I offer some preliminary thoughts on how a plaintiff might
demonstrate governmental bad faith, even in the absence of settled law. As
noted earlier, if the government consistently declines to appeal its losses, it
arguably is not seeking to vindicate its vision of the law.230 Why would the
government take this approach? Even if the losses build up, but relief extends
only to the individual plaintiffs, the government can win by losing—over
time, a regulatory regime (regardless of its legality) becomes increasingly
difficult to dismantle. Moreover, by declining to appeal, the government
avoids any binding precedent from higher courts.
One of the clearest modern examples of regulatory entrenchment is the
Affordable Care Act (colloquially known as Obamacare). By 2017, it had
gained such a strong foothold that President Trump and a Republican
Congress, which had long evinced hostility to the regime, could not muster
the votes to repeal it. This is an example of regulatory entrenchment but not
bad faith because the Obama Administration had actively defended its
position, including twice before the Supreme Court.231
Identifying situations in which the government declines to appeal
adverse lower court rulings with the clear intent of entrenching a regime,
rather than actually defending its legality, is difficult. In part, this is because
courts are increasingly willing to grant nationwide injunctions, which are
justifiable precisely to avoid this kind of bad faith. Professor Bray has
17–36009, 2017 WL 8229552 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 772
(D. Md. 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17–2398, 2018 WL 2717050 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018).
229. See Trump v. Stockman, No. 18A627 (Jan. 22, 2019) (granting the government’s
application for stay pending outcome of appeal); Trump v. Karnoski, No. 18A625 (Jan. 22, 2019)
(same).
230. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 756–57 (arguing that government may decline
to acquiesce as long as it is actively attempting to vindicate its position).
231. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (explaining the government’s position
that Obamacare’s requirement to purchase insurance or pay the IRS was lawful); NFIB v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 546–47 (2012) (discussing the government’s position that Congress had constitutional
authority to enact an individual mandate).
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suggested one such example, though, in which the Supreme Court issued a
rare stay pending disposition while lower courts considered challenges to
President Obama’s Clean Power Plan.232 This well could have been a
situation in which the court foresaw that if the plan remained in place long
enough, the regime would become entrenched, regardless of how courts
ultimately ruled on the challenges.
D.

The Limits of Class Actions
Some critics of nationwide injunctions have argued that a superior
mechanism already exists for providing group-wide relief to similarly
situated people—a properly certified class action.233 Frequently it does offer
a better way to accord broad relief. After all, the class-certification process
tests whether plaintiffs share certain commonalities, whether the named
plaintiffs will serve as adequate class representatives, and whether lawyers
will sufficiently represent the group’s interests.234 But class actions are not a
panacea. Moreover, a reflexive appeal to class actions risks glossing over the
complex ways that aggregate litigation—and, specifically, public-rights
litigation—already takes place in nonclass proceedings. Nationwide
injunctions fit comfortably within that broader phenomenon.
First, a class action does not always obviate the concerns about
nationwide injunctions. Imagine that a court certifies a nationwide class of
plaintiffs, as, for example, one court in California did when considering
President Trump’s family separation policy.235 If that court is the first to
consider the matter and then issues a broad injunction, the one-and-done
problem remains. That is, one court’s decision, even in the context of a
properly certified class action, can freeze the law after only a single lawsuit,
thereby thwarting percolation of the issue through the courts.236 Moreover,
insisting on class actions does nothing to curtail the plaintiffs’ incentive to
forum shop.
Second, there is no hard-and-fast division between class actions and
other forms of aggregate litigation.237 Many cases contain an “inherently
232. Bray, supra note 2, at 477; see also Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999, 999
(2016) (granting stay pending disposition).
233. Bray, supra note 2, at 475–76; Wasserman, supra note 9, at 366–68; see also Letter from
Law Professors to Members of Congress Regarding H.R. 6730, at 137 (Sept. 10, 2018) (endorsing
courts’ power to accord broad relief in conjunction with a properly certified class).
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (g) (articulating these requirements for class actions in federal
court).
235. See Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (“ICE”), 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1139
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (certifying a class of migrant parents separated from their children at the border),
appeal docketed, No. 18-56151 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2018).
236. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 542.
237. Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate
Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 624 (2011).
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aggregate dimension,” even when a plaintiff nominally litigates on an
individualized basis.238 And certain cases that in theory could proceed as a
class action rarely do so when a class action offers no advantages over
individual lawsuits.239 This frequently happens when a plaintiff alleges that a
statute or regulation is facially unconstitutional,240 but the phenomenon is
manifest in other public-rights lawsuits. For example, when one person seeks
a document from the government under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),241 the request and any resulting lawsuits can effectively make a
document available not simply to the individual but instead to the entire
world.242 In these situations, class actions are largely unnecessary,243 and for
precisely that reason, judges sometimes decline to certify classes in such
cases.244 Moreover, individual plaintiffs often have an incentive not to seek
class certification because if a class is certified and the plaintiffs lose, then
that adverse judgment binds all of them. By contrast, if the group members
proceed one at a time in individualized suits, then an adverse judgment affects
only the one losing plaintiff; the other members of the group remain free to
bring their own lawsuits.245
Third, class actions are often ineffectual in dealing with “embedded
aggregation,” which Professor Nagareda described as individual litigation
that “gives rise to demands for the suit to bind nonparties in some fashion.”246
Return to the FOIA request, which nicely illustrates the problem. Assume
that one person requests a document, the government denies the request, and
an ensuing lawsuit vindicates the government’s position. A second person
comes along and requests the same document, but he also loses a lawsuit.
And so on until one person prevails against the government. Note that this
does not simply lead to inconsistent results. The government’s one loss
effectively nullifies all of its earlier victories because the document now
becomes available to the whole world. So, there is obviously an aggregate
238. Carroll, supra note 47, at 2019.
239. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 207
(noting that certain cases create an incentive for plaintiffs not to seek class certification).
240. See, e.g., All. to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is
important to note whether the suit is attacking a statute or regulation as being facially
unconstitutional. If so, then there would appear to be little need for the suit to proceed as a class
action.”).
241. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
242. Under FOIA, the government technically discloses the document only to the requesting
party, but that party may then make the document available to the entire public.
243. Marcus, supra note 89, at 823.
244. E.g., Kan. Health Care Ass’n v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1548
(10th Cir. 1994); Davis v. Smith, 607 F.2d 535, 540 (2d Cir. 1978); Mills v. District of Columbia,
266 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010).
245. Trammell, supra note 43, at 572.
246. Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1105, 1108 (2010).
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dimension to each individual lawsuit in this scenario. But as much as the
government would like to resolve once and for all whether the document is
available, FOIA currently offers no good way to do so. Moreover, a class
action does not solve the problem precisely because the plaintiffs have no
incentive to proceed on a class-wide basis.247
A distinct but related development is the manner in which precedent
increasingly binds people who did not participate in the precedent-creating
lawsuit. This obviously happens all the time outside of class actions. The
standard account of precedent in a common law system is that it concerns
pure legal questions, and when it applies, it operates with a degree of
flexibility.248 In recent years, though, scholars have documented how
precedent has become increasingly rigid, at times verging on absolute.249
Moreover, precedent has begun to apply not just to large legal questions but
also to mixed questions of law and fact as well as intensely factual
questions.250 When this happens, the first person to litigate a matter can wind
up creating sweeping precedent that becomes binding on people who did not
have notice of the precedent-creating lawsuit or have an opportunity to
participate in it. Thus, in a subtle way, the surreptitious expansion of
precedent offers essentially another example of aggregate litigation that binds
nonparties.
I am not endorsing all of the various ways that aggregate litigation can
take place and the ways that nonparties can be bound by lawsuits. Rather,
these developments highlight the fact that aggregate litigation often poses
difficult and nuanced problems that will vary from context to context.
Nationwide injunctions are very much part of that conversation. While some
scholars have convincingly argued that class actions can usefully address
certain aggregate-litigation problems,251 class actions are not always the
solution. Instead, judges and scholars should think systematically about the
nature of the problems and the best ways to engage them. This Article has

247. In Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 885 (2008), this is exactly what the plaintiffs did.
Because they proceeded sequentially, rather than as part of a class action, the second plaintiff was
not bound by the adverse judgment against the first.
248. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 15 (2001).
249. See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1043–
47 (2003) (noting the increasing rigidity of precedent and stare decisis); Max Minzner, Saving Stare
Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010 BYU L. REV. 597, 606–09
(2010) (noting the current inflexibility in stare decisis doctrine).
250. Trammell, supra note 43, at 588.
251. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 47, at 2022, 2075–79 (discussing advantages of class action
suits and suggesting reforms to the current class action system); Marcus, supra note 89, at 821
(emphasizing that public interest class action lawsuits allow claims to be adjudicated that might
otherwise not be addressed).
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aspired to do that by identifying the specific concerns that inhere in
nationwide injunctions and offering ways to ameliorate those concerns.
E.

The Role of Party Status
Finally, the most trenchant criticism of the preclusion model—that it
elides a critical distinction between parties and nonparties—merits brief
discussion. Part I showed that there are no constitutional or structural
constraints on courts’ power to issue nationwide injunctions that benefit
nonparties. I respond here to more prudential concerns.
Critics of nationwide injunctions would argue that the analogy between
such injunctions and preclusion is fundamentally flawed because whether
someone is an actual party to litigation makes all the difference. Assume that
A sues the government and wins; B then sues the government and invokes
preclusion, essentially piggybacking on A’s victory. In this scenario—the
critics say—B indeed might be able to take advantage of preclusion, but only
because B actually brought her own lawsuit. That is, unlike in the nationwide
injunction context, B became a party to a lawsuit.
In this telling, a lawsuit results in a judgment, which only parties may
enforce.252 By contrast, nonparties to a lawsuit may not directly benefit from
the judgment but instead may indirectly take advantage of the precedent that
the court creates (and even then, only when the nonparty eventually brings
her own lawsuit).253
The critics’ observation is true, so far as it goes—in one scenario (the
preclusion context), B eventually becomes a party; in another scenario (the
nationwide injunction), B always remains a nonparty. Sometimes party status
is quite significant. For example, if someone who is subject to an injunction
disobeys it, then the opposing party may enforce the injunction through a
contempt proceeding.254 A nonparty, by contrast, has no such power at his
disposal. But the distinction between parties and nonparties cannot bear the
weight of explaining why, as the critics contend, nationwide injunctions may
never directly benefit nonparties.

252. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 9, at 244 (arguing that a “court’s judgment and
injunction compel conduct by the named defendants as to the named plaintiffs”); Bruhl, supra note
9, at 517 (“Judgments are specific to the parties before the court.”).
253. See Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 9, at 250 (“As to nonparties, the force of the
judgment and opinion justifying the judgment derives entirely from the doctrine of precedent.”); id.
at 251 (“Precedent can be enforced as to those new parties only through that additional step of new
litigation.”); see also Bray, supra note 2, at 474 (“Because the plaintiff is the one who took the
initiative and sued, it is the plaintiff who is protected. Others can receive the same protection if they
take the same action by bringing their own suits (invoking the authority of the earlier decision).”);
Bruhl, supra note 9, at 506 (“Everyone gets the decision’s precedential value . . . but only the parties
get the judgment that definitively decides their rights and liabilities.”).
254. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 224 (1974).
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Consider how two of the most forceful and eloquent advocates of this
argument, Professors Josh Blackman and Howard Wasserman, describe their
alternative vision. They focus on the marriage-equality litigation, which is a
useful way to illustrate their essential arguments as well as the flaws of
categorically rejecting nationwide injunctions.
Begin with the litigation in California over Proposition 8 (Prop 8), which
prohibited same-sex marriage. Two couples successfully challenged the
constitutionality of the provision, and the resulting injunction enjoined
California officials from enforcing the marriage ban against anyone, not just
the plaintiffs.255 This case predated both United States v. Windsor256 and
Obergefell v. Hodges,257 which together announced a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage. Moreover, for various procedural reasons, no one
actually had standing to appeal the Prop 8 decision.258 Blackman and
Wasserman argue that the injunction was overbroad and should have
benefited only the actual plaintiffs.259 Based on the theory that I have
developed here, I agree with their conclusion, but not because of an inviolable
distinction between parties and nonparties. Rather, the law regarding samesex marriage simply was not yet settled.
Now return to a very different scenario mentioned earlier—Kim Davis’s
obstinacy in refusing to issue marriage licenses, even in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision. Based on the theory embraced by
many scholars that a judgment, strictly speaking, applies only to the actual
parties to a lawsuit,260 Kim Davis technically was not bound by the judgment
in Obergefell. On this view, when couples who were not parties to the
Obergefell lawsuit sought marriage licenses from Kim Davis, nothing
formally compelled her to issue licenses. In order to take advantage of
Obergefell, nonparties would have to bring their own lawsuits, and only by
securing their own judgments could they compel Davis (by virtue of the
judgment itself or an injunction to enforce it) to issue a license.
Professors Blackman and Wasserman partially ground their argument in
departmentalism—the idea that courts do not decide what “the Constitution
means for everybody,”261 but rather that federal and state officials “wield
independent power to interpret the Constitution and to act on their own

255. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
256. 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013).
257. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
258. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013) (holding that proposition proponents did
not have standing even though government declined to appeal).
259. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 9, at 249–50.
260. E.g., Bray, supra note 2, at 465; Bruhl, supra note 9, at 507–08, 517; Morley, De Facto
Class Actions?, supra note 9, at 516.
261. Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1713, 1715 (2017).
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constitutional understandings.”262 Thus, Kim Davis had a right to interpret
the Constitution as she saw fit and behave accordingly. This is supposedly
true, even in the face of Obergefell, unless and until another judgment from
another lawsuit compelled her to issue a marriage license to specific parties.
Professors Blackman and Wasserman are admirably candid about the import
of their theory. Even those who aren’t thoroughgoing departmentalists
essentially invite the same official intransigence when they insist that an
injunction may never benefit a nonparty. The only palliative is an appeal to
practicality and civic virtue—the aspiration that most officials don’t behave
like Kim Davis.263
This view essentially leads to government by litigation. Law is never
settled, and (absent voluntary compliance) it never applies to anyone who has
not brought her own lawsuit. Every parent must sue school boards that
disagree with Brown v. Board of Education264 and seek to maintain
segregated schools. Every person must initiate a lawsuit to avoid having to
pay a tax that courts have declared unconstitutional. Every same-sex couple
that wants to marry must sue clerks, emboldened by Kim Davis’s example,
who disagree with Obergefell.
But this is not how government does or should work. Sometimes
disuniformity and legal uncertainty are unavoidable.265 Moreover, as I have
emphasized, different courts should have an opportunity to weigh in on a
particular legal question. At some point, though, the law can become settled.
This is true when the Supreme Court conclusively resolves a matter, but
it can happen even short of that level of clarity.266 The idea that law can
become broadly settled and enforceable is most evident in light of the modern
interpretation of § 1983,267 which permits damages actions against state
officials who violate a person’s federal civil rights.268 Modern civil rights

262. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 9, at 252.
263. See id. at 257 (arguing “that state officials can, and usually will, conform their conduct to
precedent as to similarly situated persons”); see also Bruhl, supra note 9, at 550 (“Today it is only
barely conceivable that government officials would treat a Supreme Court decision as applicable
only to the named plaintiffs while continuing to act on their own contrary understanding of the law
as to all other persons similarly situated.”).
264. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
265. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (2008) (asserting
that uniform interpretations of federal law are not possible because of the large number of courts
that do not have to follow one another’s precedents and the tiny fraction of cases that the Supreme
Court decides).
266. One might quibble with whether the “rule of three” draws the line in the correct place, but
this does not undermine the idea that the law can become clear.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
268. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (holding that plaintiffs may sue state
officials who abuse state law and violate plaintiffs’ federal civil rights); see also Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that even officials who presumptively enjoy qualified
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litigation rests on the premise that law indeed becomes settled, for without
that predicate, § 1983 would become a dead letter. Citizens may rely on the
eminently reasonable assumption that officials will abide by settled law, and
they may seek compensation when officials fail to do so.269
In other words, the argument that officials are bound only by the literal
words of a judgment (and only with respect to the actual parties to a lawsuit)
is antithetical to the entire governance structure in which courts and officials
operate.270 Law can be settled—for everybody—including for those who
never participated in a lawsuit. When it is, various mechanisms exist to
ensure that the government complies with that law, and nationwide
injunctions, when deployed to this end, are both sensible and consistent with
modern jurisprudence.
Conclusion
Scholars justifiably have become concerned that courts are issuing
nationwide injunctions too often and too quickly. Such behavior risks
enshrining one judge’s idiosyncratic view of the law and preventing the
government from engaging in a good-faith effort to craft and defend complex
policies. But the other extreme is equally unattractive. A rule that absolutely
prevents courts from demanding compliance with well-established law
would invite a government of men, not laws.
At first blush, the nuts and bolts of preclusion seem to lie at the opposite
end of the spectrum from heady political debates about immigration, LGBT
equality, and environmental protection. The doctrine and theory of
preclusion, though, can explain why nationwide injunctions are neither
constitutionally problematic nor always prudent. Moreover, preclusion
reveals the precise circumstances in which courts may demand that the
government broadly comply with settled law, even for the benefit of
nonparties. In short, the preclusion model of nationwide injunctions can chart
a careful and systematic course between two unappealing extremes.

immunity are liable if they violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known”).
269. The extent to which the law is sufficiently settled to justify a nationwide injunction is not
necessarily coextensive with the degree to which law is settled under § 1983. The purposes of the
two devices are very different. Nonetheless, both rest on the concept that law indeed can be settled
at some point.
270. Blackman and Wasserman argue that mere precedent, even binding precedent, never
obligates an official to act because a nonparty may not enforce precedent through a contempt action.
Nonetheless, they concede that a “similarly situated” nonparty may bring a § 1983 action against an
official who fails to respect binding precedent. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 9, at 251–52.
To argue that binding precedent, even in the face of a § 1983 action, does not create an “obligation”
seems semantic and unhelpful.

